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CIVIL PRACTICE
Jay C. Carlisle*
This year's Survey article o n New York Civil Practice is
dedicated to our colleague Professor Richard J. Daronco, whose
untimely death in 1988 broke more than a few hearts. Professor
Daronco was better known to the bench and bar of New York as
Judge Daronco. He served as a family court judge, a justice of
the Supreme Court for the Ninth Judicial District and as a distinguished federal court judge for the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. T h e Westchester
County Court House was recently named in honor of Judge
Daronco.
For those of us who earn our living as teachers, Professor
Daronco was a special person. He taught as a n adjunct professor
at Pace University School of Law. T h e students loved Professor
Daronco's classes i n trial practice. He was a wonderful and dedicated teacher who cared for his students and inspired his colleagues. Professor, judge, father, husband, brother, son and good
friend of the faculty, deans, alumni and students of the Pace
University School of Law, we salute you with the bittersweet
words of A.E. Houseman's "To A n Athlete Dying Young."
Today, the road all runners came,
Shoulder-high we bring you home,
And set you at your threshold down,
Townsman of a stiller town.

* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. J.D.,University of California a t
Davis; A.B., University of California a t Los Angeles. Recipient of ALI-ABA 1989 Harrison
Tweed Special Merit Award for contributions to post-graduate legal education. Professor
Carlisle is a revision author for the Weinstein, Korn & Miller treatise on New York Civil
Practice and is the annotation author for the treatise's 1988 Supplement. The author is
grateful to his students a t Pace University School of Law for inspiring him to teach New
York Civil Practice. He also appreciates the assistance of Ms. Gloria Pagonico for typing her
fourth Survey article.
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J. Runaway Juries.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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....................... ... .... ... ...

This is the fourth year your author has been privileged to contribute to the Civil Practice section of the Syracuse Law Review's
Survey of New York Law.' On the date this year's piece is submitted to the Survey Editor, I will depart for England to spend the
spring semester teaching remedies at University College in
London. I will try, therefore, to follow the advise of the English

1. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1987 Survey of N.Y. Law, 39 SYRACUSE
L.REV.75 (1988);
Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1986 Survey of N.Y. Law, 38 SYRACUSE
L. REV.67 (1987); Carlisle,
Civil Practice, 1985 Survey of N.Y.Law, 37 SYRACUSE
L. REV.263 (1986). I also take this
opportunity to salute my colleague Professor Richard T. Farrell of Brooklyn Law School for
generously serving as the Survey author for ten years, beginning in 1974. See Farrell, Civil
~ REV.365 (1975). I have reviewed each of
Practice, 1974 Survey of N.Y. Law, 26 S m c u s L.
Professor Farrell's ten Survey pieces and always strive to emulate his decisive analysis and
review of recent developments in the CPLR. (Dick, your 1978 Survey piece, which highlights
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), is an oldie but a goodie!).
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poet Robert Southey, written more than a century ago, "'[ilt is
with words as with sunbeams, the more they are condensed, the
deeper they burn.' "2
During the 1988 Survey year, new sanction rules, effective
January 1, 1989, were approved by the Court of appeal^,^ several
Uniform Rules were amended: and existing rules applied by our
court^.^ New legislation was also passed relating to a comprehensive Interest On Lawyers Account (IOLA)? The Court of Appeals
abolished the fiduciary shield doctrine: limited the reach of our
long-arm statute (CPLR 302(a)(1))8 in defamation actions: and
ruled that motions to dismiss cannot be converted into summary
judgments without notice to all parties.1° The Court of Appeals
also refined the doctrine of issue preclusion,ll which has recently
been expanded,12 and issued interesting opinions involving statutes
of limitation13 and successive tort-feasor law.14 Also, in June of
1988, the United States Supreme Court delivered a series of decisions which affect New York's substantive law pertaining to the

2. Rathvon, I Heard Lincoln That Day, 60 N.Y. ST. B.J. 18, 19-21 (Nov. 1988). The bar
is grateful to Westchester's H. Glen Hall for having transcribed William R. Rathvon's radio
broadcast in 1938 from a long-playing Trans Radio Record citing the English poet Robert
Southey.
3. Reprinted in MCKINNEY'S
1989 N.Y. RULESOF THE COURT
pts. 130,130-a (22 NYCRR
130, 130-a). See also Top State Court Adopts Sanction Rules, 200 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26, 1988,
at 1, col. 4 [hereinafter Sanction Rules]; Seigel, New and Broad Sanctions Rules Take Effect January 1, 1988, 347 N.Y. ST. L. DIG., Nov. 1988, a t 1. (Professor Siegel's discussion of
the new sanction rules features a checklist review which is "must reading" for the bench and
bar.).
4. See infra notes 103-25 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1360 (codified
6. See Act of Sept. 1,1988, ch. 677,1988 MCKINNEY'S
a t N.Y. JUD.
LAW$ 497 (McKinney Supp. 1989)).
7. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
8. N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(l) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989).
9. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 390-91 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 370-84 and accompanying text.
12. See Civil Practice, 1987 Survey, supra note 1, at 141-47.
13. See infra notes 331-33 and accompanying text.
14. See Barker, Successive Tort-Feasors, 200 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 27, 1988, a t 3, col. 1 (discussing Glaser v. Fortunoff, 71 N.Y.2d 643, 524 N.E.2d 413, 529 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1988)) (concluding that "a successive tort-feasor can be jointly liable with the primary tort-feasor, and
not . . . liable only for the injuries he infiicted, when the injury is found to be single and
undivisible"); see also Barker, Recent Developments, 199 N.Y.L.J., Apr. 25, 1988, a t 1, col.
1; Barker, Successive Tortfeasors, 199 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 1988, a t 1, col. 1.
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Hague Convention (service abroad),16notice of claim procedures in
civil rights cases,16 and forum selection clauses under CPLR
327(b).17 These developments and other significant decisional law
by New York trial and appellate courts will be analyzed.

A. New Legislation
Appendix A lists new CPLR amendments enacted during the
1988 Survey year and summarizes amendments that are important
to practitioners. The comments found in the Appendix regarding
the new legislation only provide a brief overview and the complete
text can be found in many different source^.'^
Notwithstanding Appendix A, several CPLR amendments
should be noted. CPLR 3101 has been amended to add a new subparagraph (d)(l)(ii),le which allows a party to offer to her adversary a proposal by which all experts would be identified and deposed.20CPLR 5519 has been amended to add a new subsection
(g),21which requires that a defendant need only post a bond in the
amount of $1 million at the maximum to stay enforcement of a
judgment.22 This will unfortunately allow appellate courts to stay
enforcement of judgments if there is "a reasonable possibility that

15. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
16. See Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988); see also infra note 340 and accompanying text.
17. N.Y. CPLR 327(b) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989); see also infra note 267 and
accompanying text.
18. The complete text should be available for review in the 1988 CPLR publications by
Matthew Bender, Gould Publications or West's McKinney Commentaries. Copies of the entire legislative texts may be obtained by contacting the Department of Governmental Relations. The practitioner should also consider subscribing to the Annual Legislative Bulletin
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The Bulletin analyzes the merits of
the proposed bills and discusses their impact on current laws. It is an excellent research tool
and will keep the practitioner abreast of developments in Albany well in advance of the
Survey's publication.
19. N.Y. CPLR 3lOl(d)(l)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
20. See id.; see also infra note 405 and accompanying text; Kramer & Moore, Medical
Malpractice: Comment on New Legislation, 200 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 1, 1988, a t 3, col. 1 (Daniel
Kramer, Esq., is the new author for the Survey's section on Torts.); Siege], Practice Commentaries, N.Y. CPLR 3101, a t 4-5 (McKinney Supp. 1989).
21. N.Y. CPLR 5519(g) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
22. See id.; see also Seigel, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. CPLR 5519, a t 80 (McKinney
Supp. 1989).
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the judgment may be reversed or determined ex~essive."~~
The
CPLR was also amended in relation to prima facie proof of dama g e and
~ ~ in
~ relation to the payment of fees to a county
both of which became effective in July of 1988. Fee requirements
of county clerks, CPLR 8018, was also amended by adding new
subdivision (f),26which sets forth new fees for copies of records,
and some prior requirements for certification, exemplification and
copies of papers were deleted from CPLR 8020.27 In addition, effective January 1, 1989, new special parts for the hearing of commercial claims will be effective in the district courts and city
Essentially, the law creates a small claims court for corporations, partnerships and associations because existing small claims
courts allow only for natural persons to bring actions.2s
Finally, an important new piece of legislation is Chapter 677,
which became effective February 1, 1989, and amends New York's
IOLA program relating to interest on lawyer accounts.30It requires
all New York attorneys to place qualified funds in an IOLA account in a banking institution offering such accounts.31 The apparent purpose of the new bill is to provide funds for legal services
and for the improvement of New York's administration of justice

B. New Sanction Rules
Last year's Survey warned the practitioner of new "across the
board" sanction rules for frivolous litigation practices.33Despite a

23. Seigel, supra note 22, a t 80.
24. See N.Y. CPLR 4533-a (McKinney Supp. 1989).
25. See N.Y. CPLR 8018 (McKinney Supp. 1989).
26. N.Y. CPLR 8018(f) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
27. N.Y. CPLR 8020 (McKinney Supp. 1989); Act of July 1,1988, ch. 192,1988 MCKINNEY'S SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 379.
28. See Act of Aug. 4,1987, ch. 653,1987 MCKINNEY'S
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1141-55. The
Act adds an Article 18-A to the New York City Civil Court Act, as well as to the Uniform
District Court Act and the Uniform City Court Act. The legislation does not become effective in the New York City Civil Court until January 1, 1991.
29. See id.
30. See Act of Sept. 1,1988, ch. 677, 1988 MCKINNEY'S
SESS.
LAWSOF N.Y. 1360 (codified a t N.Y. JUD. LAW1 497 (McKinney Supp. 1989)).
31. See id.
32. The IOLA Fund will distribute information to attorneys regarding their obligations
under the new law and information on participating banks.
33. See Civil Practice, 1987 Survey, supra note 1, a t 85-87.
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large and vociferous response by the bar,34three new rules, effective January 1, 1988, were enacted which authorize:
financial penalties up to $250 against lawyers who fail to appear
without good cause at scheduled criminal proceedings, and up to
$10,000 against lawyers or litigants who engage in what a court
determines are frivolous civil actions . . . . One of the rules, a Rule
of the Chief Judge, authorizes the sanctions. The other two regulations, Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge, list definitions
and criteria to be considered by judges in imposing the
penal tie^.^^

The new sanction rules will be in addition to those already
applied in state courtsS6and in federal courts under Rule 11of the
Although former Chief AdminFederal Rules of Civil Pr~cedure.~'
istrative Judge Albert M. Rosenblatt assures the bar that the new
rules will be "sparingly applied"38 in only "rare and necessary
cases,"39 a state practitioner, familiar with Federal Rule 11 sanction cases, has reason to be alarmed. For example, a solo practitioner was "ordered by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit to pay $100,000 in sanctions imposed two years ago by a
federal judge for repeatedly pushing an untrue claim in a copyright
infringement suit."" In addition, there are over 700 reported cases

34. See Wise, County Bar Report Objects t o Draft of Sanction Rules, 198 N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 5, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (discussing many objections to the Office o f Court Administration
proposal authorizing judges to impose sanctions against attorneys for frivolous litigation);
Chase, Sanctions i n State Courts-Proposed Rule Needs Changes, 198 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 22,
1987, at 1, col. 3 (stating that the "disadvantages o f judicial sanctions are likely to outweigh
the advantages"); Note, The Use of Rule 11 Sanctions and Prevailing Party Fee-Shifting
Statutes After Rule 41(a)(I)(i) Notice Dismissal, 88 COLUMBIA
L. REV. 1512 (1988);see also
Menaker, Sanctions for Frivolous Litigation: Should New York Have a Counterpart to
Federal Rule 11?,59 N.Y. ST. B.J. 31,33-34 (Nov. 1987) (stating that Rule 11 has a number
o f weaknesses which should be avoided b y any New York rule).
35. Sanction Rules, supra note 3, at 1, col. 4, 6.
36. See N.Y. CPLR 8303-a (McKinney Supp. 1989);N.Y. C P L R 3126 (McKinney 1970
& Supp. 1989); MCKINNEY'S1988 N.Y. RULESOF T H E COURT $ 202.12(g) (22 N Y C R R
202.12(g)); Carlisle, CPLR 8303-a: Attorney's Fees Sanctions for Frivolous Claims and DeB.J. 273 (Summer 1987) (discussing the sancfenses Filed i n Tort Cases, 14 WESTCHESTER
tions under CPLR 8303-a).
37. FED. R. CIV.P. 11.
38. Statement b y Chief Judge Albert M. Rosenblatt, Administrative Judge for the
State o f New York, at the Special Meeting on Sanctioning Frivolous Litigation i n State and
Federal Courts (Nov. 9, 1988).
39. Id.
40. Squiers, $100,000 Sanction Against Lawyer Firm, 200 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 16,1988, at 1,
col. 3.
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in the federal courts involving Rule 11 sanctions."' As stated by
Chief Judge Charles Brieant: "[flederal judges are issuing traffic
tickets to those who clog the courts"42and New York State judges
can now "fine lawyers for screwing up the business of the ~ourts."'~
Unfortunately, Chief Judge Brieant also notes that two-thirds of
the federal sanctions cases have been brought against plaintiffs
and their attorneys."' The federal bar does not know what the
standards are because the "Chancellor's
is applied in
highly subjective opinions, many of which are not publi~hed.4~
Chief Judge Brieant observes that Rule 11 sanctions create
collateral litigation, poison the atmosphere making settlement difficult, and replace civil RICO claims as a cottage industry for lawyer~.'~
Nonetheless, one report on federal sanctions under Rule 11
indicates that 77% of the lawyers and 90% of the judges approve
of Rule 11 sanction^."^ Similarly, the Office of Court Administration (OCA) claims that a majority of New York Civil Practice law~ also states that their rules differ
yers favor the new r ~ l e s . 4OCA
from the federal rules in three key areas: (1)New York rules use
"permissive" rather than the "mandatory" federal language;50 (2)
New York rules have a $10,000 cap while the fine is "unlimited"
under the federal rules;61 and (3) New York rules are subject to
interlocutory appeals to the Appellate division^.^^
The new sanction rules are implemented in Part 130 of the
Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge.63The rules apply to acts
occurring on or after January 1, 1989, affecting not only new ac-

41. See supra note 38.
42. Id. (statement by Chief Judge Charles L. Brieant).
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. See Burbank, The Chancellor's Boot, 54 BROOKLYN
L. REV.31 (1988).
46. See supra note 38.
47. See id. See generally Bates, The Rule 11 Debate, 4 Years Later, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 13,
1987, at 3, col. 1 (discussing the pitfalls of Rule 11).
48. See supra note 38 (statement of Hon. Shira Seheindlin).
49. See id.
50. See id. (statement of Hon. Michael Colodner, Counsel to the Office of Court Administration for the New York State Courts).
51. See id.
52. See id. This is wonderful news for our Appellate Division judges who will no doubt
spend their 1989 summer vacations reading Rule 11 sanction cases in an effort to learn how
to define frivolity.
1989 N.Y. RULESOF THE COURT
pt. 130 (22 NYCRR 130).
53. See MCKINNEY'S
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tions, but pending ones as well.64Part 130-at6applicable to unjustified failure to attend a scheduled appearance in a criminal action
or proceeding, authorizes financial penalties not to exceed $250
against lawyers who fail to appear without good cause.66What constitutes good cause? An affidavit of actual engagement should be
enough, but is an actual engagement in the city court of Mount
Vernon for a harassment defense good cause not to appear in New
York Supreme Court for a homicide motion? Practitioners, however, should be aware that Part 130-a is not applicable in town or
village courts.67
Part 130 of the new sanction rules is entitled "Awards of Costs
and Imposition of Financial Sanctions for Frivolous Conduct in
This rule is inapplicable for requests of costs or
Civil Litigati~n."~~
fees subject to CPLR 8303-ats covering frivolous claims or defenses in tort actions, wrongful death claims, and medical malpractice cases.BOAdditionally, Part 130 does not apply to town or village courts, small claims courts or to proceedings commenced
under articles 3,7, 8 or 10 of the Family Court Act.B1 It does apply,
however, to "any other piece of conduct that can earn the ignominious frivolity label,"62 including motions, appeals, special proceedings, Article 78 proceedings against administrative actions, and
summary proceedings. The new rule also includes as frivolous conduct the making of an unjustified motion,BSand can be applied by
judges of the Housing Part of the New York City Civil Court.@
Moreover, rule 130.1 permits the court at its discretion to
award any party or attorney in any civil action or proceeding the
actual expenses and reasonable attorney's fees resulting from frivolous conduct.B6In addition, in lieu of awarding costs, the court may
a t its discretion impose financial sanctions upon any party or at-

54. See id.
55. Id. pt. 130-a (22 NYCRR 130-a).
56. See id. 5 130-a.2 (22 NYCRR 130-a.2).
57. See id. 5 130-a.l(a) (22 NYCRR 130-a.l(a)).
58. Id. pt. 130 (22 NYCRR 130).
59. See id. 5 130.5 (22 NYCRR 130.5).
60. See N.Y. CPLR 8303-a (McKinney Supp. 1989).
1989 N.Y. RULESOF THE COURT5 130.l(a) (22 NYCRR 130.l(a)).
61. See MCKINNEY'S
62. Siegel, supra note 3, at 1.
63. See MCKINNEY'S
1989 N.Y. RULESOF THE COURT5 130.l(c)(ii) (22 NYCRR
130.1(c)(ii)).
64. See id. 5 130.4 (22 NYCRR 130.4).
65. See id. 5 130.l(a) (22 NYCRR 130.l(a)).
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torney for frivolous litigation.==The payment of costs or the imposition of sanctions can be against either the attorney, the party or
both.B7 The penalties can be against the attorney personally or
upon a partnership, firm, corporation, government agency, prosecutor's office, legal aid society or public defender's office with
which the attorney is associated and that has appeared as attorney
of record.B8 Financial sanctions assessed against an attorney are
paid to the Clients Security Fund, while financial sanctions paid
by a party go the State Commissioner of Taxation and Finance.B9
Cost awards go to the party or to the attorney and may include
disbursements and attorney's fees.70Finally, an award for costs or
sanctions may be sought by motion, cross motion or by the court
on its own motion,'I but financial penalties can only be granted
upon a written decision setting forth the conduct on which the
award or imposition is based and the reasons why the amount
awarded is appr~priate.?~
There remains the question of what is frivolous conduct? Part
130.l(c) states:
(c) For purposes of this Part, conduct is frivolous if:
(i) it is completely without merit in law or fact and cannot be
supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law; or
(ii) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another.7s

The rule also directs the court to consider the "circumstances
under which the conduct took place, including the time available
for investigating the legal or factual basis of the conduct"74 and
"whether or not the conduct was continued when its lack of legal
or factual basis was apparent or should have been apparent to
counsel."76

66. See id.
67. See id. 3 130.l(b) (22 NYCRR 130.l(b)).
68. See id.
69. See id. 130.3 (22 NYCRR 130.3).
70. See id. 3 130.l(a) (22 NYCRR 130.l(a)).
71. See id. 3 130.l(d) (22 NYCRR 130.l(d)).
72. See id. 8 130.2 (22 NYCRR 130.2).
73. Id. 3 130.l(c) (22 NYCRR 130.l(c)).
74. Id.
75. Id. Thus, the practitioner should build a paper record to support a motion for
sanctions.
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The first question for attorneys concerned with the impact of
the new rules is the meaning of the term "frivolous." It is highly
likely that the state courts will follow the federal courts' objective
standard suggested by Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New
Y ~ r k instead
?~
of a more subjective standard that would be more
apt to protect attorneys who make honest but unreasonable conclusions about the factual or legal strength of their cases.??
The second question relates to the amount of costs and sanctions to be awarded under the new rules. The court can order that
the costs and sanctions be paid by either the client or his attorn e ~ . ?As~ to the amount awarded, this determination should depend on the court's consideration of mitigating factors such as: (1)
whether the client and lawyer believed they were correct in taking
the course they did; (2) whether the frivolity was for the purpose
of punishing an opponent; (3) whether the lawyer is a neophyte or
an experienced advocate; (4) the ability to pay; (5) the need for
compensation; (6) the degree of frivolity; and (7) the dangers of
chilling the particular kind of litigation involved.
Lawyers seeking to avoid sanctions under the new rules should
take protective measures. First, before filing any pleading or taking
any course of action during litigation, the attorney should read the
rules. This is important, not so much as an exercise, but to assist
the practitioner in resisting a sanction motion because an affidavit
can be filed asserting that the sanctions were specifically considered. A practitioner should consider whether the facts of the case

76. 762 F.2d 243,253-54 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987) (holding that
"a showing of subjectively bad faith is no longer required to trigger the sanctions imposed
by. . . rule [Ill"); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987) (increasing sanction of $1000 imposed by district court on
client to $10,000, allocated between both client and attorney, without explanation of why
the former constituted an abuse of discretion); see also Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265,
1275 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1372 (1987) (stating that Rule 11 is violated
"only when it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success"). See generally Note, Plausible Pleadings Developing Standards for Rule I 1 Sanctions, 100 HARV.L.
REV.630 (1987).
77. Former Chief Judge Weinstein, in Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637
F. Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1987), suggests that the subjective element of a sanction rule is satisfied when an attorney makes a "reasonable inquiry
into the facts and law." Id. a t 567. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, in a
previous Eastway opinion, held that "sanctions should be imposed . .. [if] after reasonable
inquiry, a competent attorney could not form a reasonable belief that the pleading is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law . . . ."Eastway, 762 F.2d a t 254.
1989 N.Y. RULESOF THE COURT3 130.l(b) (22 NYCRR 130.l(b)).
78. See MCKINNEY'S
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justify the filing of a particular pleading. For example, is the pleading in question based upon existing law or seeking an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law? Is it counsel's intent to
harass, delay or increase the cost of the litigation? Some lawyers,
as a matter of common practice, may assert sanction defenses in
their answers. These assertions would appear to be a violation of
the new sanctions rule.
Another factor to raise in resisting the imposition of sanctions
under the new rules is the amount of time available for investigation. For example, if the sanctioned matter arises in a special pro~eeding,'~ the amount of time available to investigate or make a
"reasonable inquiry" would be far less than that involved in most
kinds of litigation. One must also consider the source of information upon which the attorney relied. In many instances, the information must come from the client, placing a duty on counsel to
verify pertinent facts. In addition, sanctions are less likely to be
applied when the present attorney relied upon the representations
of forwarding counsel or some other member of the bar. Finally,
lawyers should be aware of sanctions that can be applied under the
new individual assignment rules,8O CPLR 312681 or pursuant to
CPLR 8303-a.82

C. Revised Rules for Fiduciaries
Revised rules for fiduciaries' handling of accounts became effective on November 30, 1988. These revisions amend Part 603s3of
the Appellate Division Rules in the First Department and Part
69lS4which governs conduct of attorneys in the Second Depart-

79. Statutes authorizing special proceedings are found in and out of the CPLR. See
generally D. SIEGEL,NEWYORKPRACTICE3 547 (1978).
1989 N.Y. RULESOF THE COURT3 202.12 (f) (22 NYCRR 202.12(f)).
80. See MCKINNEY'S
81. N.Y. CPLR 3126 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1989).
82. N.Y. CPLR 8303-a (McKinney Supp. 1989). For a more detailed discussion of
CPLR 8303-a, see Carlisle, supra note 36; see ako Anderson, Sanctions Available for Bad
Faith Claim, 200 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 24, 1988, a t 1, col. 3 (discussing first significant application
of CPLR 8303-a sanctions for frivolous actions in Eagle Ins. Co. u. Ruez in the Supreme
Court, Nassau County).
83. MCKINNEY'S
1989 N.Y. RULESOF THE COURTpt. 603 (22 NYCRR 603). The Appellate Division justices for the First Judicial Department amended Part 603 of the Rules of
the Court by rescinding section 603.15 and substituting revised rules on fiduciary responsibility. See id. 3 603.15 (22 NYCRR 603.15).
84. Id. pt. 691 (22 NYCRR 691). The Appellate Division justices for the Second Department amended section 691.12 of Part 691 by revising the rules on fiduciary responsibil-
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ment. The new requirements provide that all special accounts,
wherein an attorney is in possession of any money or other asset of
a client, other than where an attorney maintains an account as executor, guardian, trustee or receiver, must be maintained in a separate bank account, apart from the personal or business accounts of
the attorney or the attorney's firm.86All attorneys with offices in
the First and Second Departments should obtain the complete text
of the revised rules; the changes are identical in both departments.
Pay close attention to the elaborate bookkeeping records which
must be maintained and retained for seven years after the events
which they record,ss and note the annual certification of compliance requiring an attorney to file an affidavit with the clerk of the
court, no later than January, 31 of each year, certifying that attorney's compliance with the revised regulation^.^^ Failure to file the
certification may result in disciplinary action against the attorn e ~ Also,
. ~ language
~
was added to the rules to govern random review and audit of the attorney's accounts in the event such a procedure becomes mandatory.89

ity. See id. 8 691.12 (22 NYCRR 691.12).
85. See id. $8 603.15(b), 691.12(b) (22 NYCRR 603.15(b), 691.12(b)).
86. See id. $3 603.15(c), 691.12(c) (22 NYCRR 603.15(c), 691.12(c)).
87. See id. 38 603.15(1), 691.12(1) (22 NYCRR 603.15(1), 691.12(1)). The certification
should be in the following form and will be available a t all times to the Departmental Disciplinary Committee:
State of New York)
1
County of
,being duly sworn, deposes and says:
(type name)
I am familiar with DR 9-102 of the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility, as adopted by the New York State Bar Association, effective January 1,1970 as
amended, and with 8 691.12 of the Court's Rules Governing the Conduct of Attorneys, which requires an attorney to preserve the identity of funds and property
entrusted to him or her and to maintain certain records relating thereto.
I certify to this Court that I am in compliance with the above provisions of the
Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility and this Court's Rules.
Signature of Attorney
Attorney
Firm Name
Office & P.O. address
Office telephone number
Home address
Home telephone number
Id. 1 691.12(1) (22 NYCRR 691.12(1)) (identical language in 3 603.15(1)).
88. See id. 38 603,15(k), 691.12(k) (22 NYCRR 603.15(k), 691.12(k)). If you snooze, you
lose!
89. See id.
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D. Client Notification of Settlement Checks
Effective October 5, 1988, a State Insurance Department regulation requires claimants to be notified when insurance companies
forward checks of $5000 or more to a lawyer.s0 Thus, the practitioner intent on maintaining her client's trust should be sure to
expedite insurance settlement checks with due diligence.

E. Mandatory CLE and Pro Bono Work Plus Abolition of
Medical Malpractice Panels
During the 1988 Survey year, the House of Delegates of the
New York State Bar Association voted to recommend mandatory
continuing legal education (CLE) for New York State attorneys.
While the proposal must ultimately be approved by the Association's Executive Committee and adopted by the Chief Judge, Sol
Wachtler, and the respective Appellate Divisions, the practitioner
should expect some form of mandatory CLE in the near future.s1
Additionally, a twenty-two member committee appointed by the
Chief Judge is in the final stages of deliberation on "a detailed
plan that would require attorneys to donate their legal skills to
persons too poor to pay for them."s2 The committee is expected to
submit its recommendations to Judge Wachtler early in 1989.s3Implementation of the mandatory pro bono plan, requiring lawyers to
donate at least twenty hours annually, will "be left primarily to
Judge Wachtler's discretion . . . . "B4 If the plan is adopted, lawyers
will probably have "to certify bi-annually that they have performed the required free service or its e q u i ~ a l e n t . " ~With
~
mandatory CLE and pro bono requirements, revised fiduciary reg-

90. See Spencer, Clients to be Notified of Settlement Checks: Insurance Department
Rule, Aimed at Curbing Theft by Lawyers, Urged by Clients' Security Fund, 200 N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 18, 1988, at 1, col. 3.
91. See Spencer, State Bar t o Weigh Education Issue, 200 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1, 1988,at 1,
col. 4.
92. Wise, Study Near End on Lawyer's Pro Bono Plan: Panel Named by Wachtler
Weighing Required 20-Hour Annual Contribution; Vote Due i n 2 Months, 200 N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 20, 1988, at 1, col. 3; see also Souther, Mandatory Pro Bono, N.Y. COUNTYLAWYER,
Sept., 1988 (Florida and Arkansas have put mandatory public service requirements into effect and many other jurisdictions are considering the implementation o f mandatory pro
bono requirements.).
93. See Wise, supra note 92, at 1, col. 4.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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ulations, and new sanction rules, the practitioner is justified in
wondering when he will have time to practice law.
Finally, the Office of Court Administration is preparing proposed legislation to repeal the requirement that medical malpractice claims be reviewed by a panel consisting of a judge, lawyer and
Chief Judge Wachtler favors repeal of the requirement
and former Chief Administrative Judge Rosenblatt agrees because
of the needless delays caused by the panels.B7The proposal for repeal of the panel requirement is supported by twenty-five bar associations including the New York State Bar Association and the
Association of the City of New York.B8

F. Attorney Advertising
There are no new rules for 1988 regarding attorney advertising; however, practitioners interested in using Madison Avenue
techniques to increase business should be aware of the United
States Supreme Court's recent decision in Shapero v. Kentucky
In Shapero, lawyers were permitted to solicit
Bar Asso~iation.~~
legal business for preliminary gain by sending truthful and
nondeceptive letters to potential clients known to face particular
problems.loOAlso, in Anonymous v. Grievance Committee,lol the
Appellate Division, Second Department, upheld a rule, required by
all the departments, that attorney advertisements include the lawyer's name and address. A telephone number alone is not
enough.lo2
G. Uniform Rules
Prior Survey articles have discussed the adoption of the Uniform Rules and proposed amendments to the rules.lo3 Several
amendments during the Survey year are worthy of note. In addi-

96. See supra note 38.
97. See id.
98. See Wise, End Sought to Medical Malpractice Panek;, 200 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 7,1988, '
at 1, col. 3.
99. 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
100. See Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922-24.
101. 136 A.D.2d 344, 527 N.Y.S.2d 248 (2d Dep't 1988).
102. See Anonymous, 136 A.D.2d at 345, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 249.
103. See Civil Practice, 1987 Survey, supra note 1, at 84-85; Civil Practice, 1986 Survey, supra note 1, at 83-85.
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tion, the practitioner should be aware of decisional law interpreting and applying the existing rules.
Uniform Rule 202.3(c)(6)lM was effective April 1, 1988. This
rule alters the Individual Assignment System to allow a "dual
track" system.lo5Thus, a case may be assigned to one judge for all
pretrial matters and to another judge for trial.lo6The "dual track"
system is optional and whether it goes into effect in a particular
district is determined by the Chief Administrator.lo7The First Judicial District has adopted the "dual track" system, but the Ninth
Judicial District has not.lo8
Uniform Rule 202.7,'OS effective April 1, 1988, establishes a
new af5rmation requirement for certain motions. On motions for
disclosure and bills of particulars, the movant must confirm that
she conferred with opposing counsel in good faith and was not able
to resolve the dispute.110The buzz word is "good faith" which New
York courts have not yet defined. Records indicating the time,
place, nature of consultation with your adversary, and the issues
discussed should be kept to protect against issues being raised
about good faith. Failure to comply with the good-faith requirement will not result in a denial on the merits.
Under Uniform Rule 202.12(a),111 effective April 1, 1988, preliminary conferences are optional; however, a party may move for a
preliminary conference (an affirmation of good faith must be filed
with the motion) and the court may sua sponte order the
~onference."~
Uniform Rule 202.14,118 effective April 1, 1988, authorizes the
Chief Administrative Judge to expressly establish programs in the
courts utilizing the services of special masters.ll4
Uniform Rule 202.16(g),n5 effective April 1, 1988, requires motions for or related to interim maintenance or child support to be
104. MCKINNEY'S
1989 N.Y. RULESOF THE COURT8 202.3(~)(6)(22NYCRR 202.3(~)(6)).
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Id. 3 202.7 (22 NYCRR 202.7).
110. See id.
111. Id. 8 202.12(a) (22 NYCRR 202.12(a)).
112. See id.
113. Id. 8 202.14 (22 NYCRR 202.14).
114. See id.
115. Id. 8 202.16(g) (22 NYCRR 202.16(g)).

Heinonline

--

40 Syracuse L. Rev. 92 1989

19891

Civil Practice

93

decided within thirty days.'16
Uniform Rule 202.56(b) and (c),"? effective October 31, 1988,
establishes new rules in relation to medical, dental and podiatric
malpractice preliminary conferences.l18
Additional changes were also made to other Uniform Rules.
Only technical changes were made in the Uniform Rules for the
Family
while the Uniform Rules for the Court of Claims
were changed by adding section 206.19lZ0governing bifurcated trials in personal injury actions. Changes made in the Uniform Rules
for the Surrogate Court include: sections 207.53lZ1 (contents required in guardianship and competency proceedings); 207.34lZ2
(provides procedure for the use of exhibits at trial); 207.20, 207.40
and 207.44lZ3(expands list of documents to prove estate exempt
from taxation); and 207.5g1" (establishes disclosure requirements
relating to commissions and attorney's fees for an attorney-fiducimy). Also, section 214.7,lZ6relating to conciliation procedures, was
added to the Uniform Rules for Justice Courts.
Decisional law interpreting and applying the Uniform Rules
should be noted. Although, during the Survey year, money sanctions for frivolity were available only in tort actions for frivolous
claims and defenses, in England v. Gradowitz Bros. Realty
Corp.Iz6the court applied the sanctions to a mere motion.
In Peterson v. Wert,lZ7the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that plaintiff must furnish the records of a treating
physician only if he intends to call them a t tria1.lZ8Bradford v.
City of New Y ~ r k followed
'~~
the Peterson holding and ruled that

116. See id.
117. Id. !j 202.56(b), (c) (22 NYCRR 202.56(b), (c)).
118. See id.
119. Id. pt. 205 (22 NYCRR 205).
120. Id. 3 206.19 (22 NYCRR 206.19).
121. Id. 5 207.53 (22 NYCRR 207.53).
122. Id. 5 207.34 (22 NYCRR 207.34).
123. Id. $5 207.20, 207.40, 207.44 (22 NYCRR 207.20, 207.40, 207.44).
124. Id. 5 207.59 (22 NYCRR 207.59).
125. Id. 3 214.7 (22 NYCRR 214.7).
126. 137 Misc. 2d 21, 519 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co. 1987) (interpreting Uniform Rule 202.12(g)).
127. 134 A.D.2d 668, 521 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dep't 1987) (interpreting Uniform Rule
202.17).
128. See Peterson, 134 A.D.2d a t 668, 521 N.Y.S.2d a t 179.
129. 141 Misc. 2d 209,532 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1988) (interpreting
Uniform Rule 202.17).
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Uniform Rule 202.17(h) does not limit its application to examinations conducted only for litigation or pursuant to request of either
party.130
In In re Estate of Germain,131 the Appellate Division, Third
Department, held that the sixty-day rule on entering orders applies only to the moving party whose motion is granted and not to
the party moved against.132But why take a chance? Enter all orders immediately to avoid the abandonment consequences contemplated by the rule. Also, negotiations with one defendant cannot
excuse delay in entering a judgment against another.133
In Tewari v. T s o ~ t s o ~ r athe
s , ~Appellate
~~
Division, Second
Department, limited the trial court's discretion to permit service of
a late CPLR 3406(a)135notice, and ruled that the plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed.136
In Shirlbarry Realty Co. v. Village of Monticel10,l~~
the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that Uniform Rule
202.59(a) and (e), which requires exchange and filing of appraisal
reports at direction of assigned judge during the pretrial conference, applies to proceedings pending on the effective date of the
rule.138
Finally, the bench and bar should rejoice at the success of our
state's new Individual Assignment System (IAS). Despite concern
to the contrary, the IAS has reduced crowded dockets and has generally met with approval by the bar and the citizens of New
Y~rk.'~~

130. See Bradford, 141 Misc. 2d at 211, 532 N.Y.S.2d a t 1020.
131. 138 A.D.2d 918, 526 N.Y.S.2d 662 (3d Dep't 1988) (interpreting Uniform Rule
202.37).
132. See Germain, 138 A.D.2d at 919-20, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
133. See Marine Midland Bank v. Bullard, 139 Misc. 2d 1009, 528 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup.
Ct., Onondaga Co. 1988); see also Persaud v. Goriah, 200 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1988, at 24, col.
5 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.).
134. 140 A.D.2d 104, 532 N.Y.S.2d 288 (2d Dep't 1988) (interpreting Uniform Rule
202.56).
135. N.Y. C P L R 3406(a) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
136. See Tewari, 140 A.D.2d at 112, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
137. 135 A.D.2d 16, 523 N.Y.S.2d 695 (3d Dep't 1988) (interpreting Uniform Rule
202.59).
138. See Shirlbarry Realty, 135 A.D.2d at 18-19, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
139. See generally ZAS Gets Good, Poor Marks i n State Survey of Lawyers, 198
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 1987, at 1, col. 3; see also Carlisle, Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Disputes Under New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules, 54 BROOKLYNL.
REV. 95, 128 (1988) (discussing IAS).

Heinonline - - 40 Syracuse L. Rev. 94 1989

Civil Practice

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Survey seldom highlights recent decisional law on subject
matter jurisdiction. his branch of jurisdiction is often referred to
as competence. The competence of particular courts in New York
is specified in the provisions of the state constitution and in various statutes.140
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals, on a nationally
disputed point which has not been resolved by the United States
Supreme Court, held, in Simpson Electric Corp. v. Leucadea,l4'
that New York State courts share subject matter jurisdiction with
the federal courts over civil claims brought under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).142 In
Simpson, the Court of Appeals, overruling two Appellate Divisions,
concluded that RICO does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on fed~ ~ while many New York courts are relieving
eral ~ 0 u r t s . lThus,
their crowded dockets by regularly dismissing cases on grounds of
statute of limitations, res judicata and jurisdiction, the Court of
Appeals has opened the door to RICO litigation on the policy
grounds that "a determination of exclusive Federal jurisdiction
would place an obstacle in the way [of] a private litigant who, for a
variety of reasons, might prefer a State forum."14' While the Simpson decision may cause the federal bench to cheer, why encourage
lawyers in Jamestown to forego a trip to Buffalo to file their RICO
claims in federal court? Judicial uniformity and consistency are
more apt to be achieved by keeping RICO claims out of fifty separate state court systems.
On another tack, lawyers who occasionally file diversity claims
in federal court should note the Federal Judicial Improvements
and Access to Justice Act145which became law on November 19,

140. See generally 1J . WEINSTEIN,
H.KORN& A. MILLER,NEWYORKCIVILP R A ~ C8 E
301 (1986) [hereinafter 1J. WEINSTEIN].
See ako N.Y. CPLR 301 (McKinney 1986).
141. 72 N.Y.2d 450, 530 N.E.2d 860, 534 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1988).
142. See Simpson Electric, 72 N.Y.2d a t 453-54,530 N.E.2d a t 861-62,534 N.Y.S.2d a t
153-54.
143. See id. a t 455, 530 N.E.2d a t 862,534 N.Y.S.2d a t 154-55. Although the Court of
Appeals sustained jurisdiction, it rejected the RICO claim on its merits (case involved a
RICO counterclaim by a defendant who claimed the plaintiff had inflated its bills).
144. Id. a t 458, 530 N.E.2d a t 864, 534 N.Y S.2d a t 157.
145. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 100 Stat. 4643 (1988).
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1988 and increases to $50,000 from $10,000 the amount in controversy required for federal subject matter jurisdiction in all diversity cases, including those by and against decedents' estates, infants, incompetents and aliens.'46 Additional changes relating to
removal of a state action to federal court became effective on November 19, 1988 and venue changes provided by the Act became
effective on February 17, 1989. The main venue alteration is 28
U.S.C. 5 1391(c) which affects the venue of an action against, but
not by, a corporation.14'
While on the topic of diversity jurisdiction, three decisions in
the Survey year remind the bar that for diversity purposes a corporation is a citizen of the state where it is incorporated and where
it has its principal place of business.148Also, because there is a presumption against diversity, if a defendant raises an issue of improper or collusive jurisdiction, the burden is on the plaintiff to
prove that the district court's jurisdiction was properly i n ~ 0 k e d . l ~ ~
Finally, noncompliance with New York's "door closing statute,"
which precludes unauthorized foreign corporations from maintaining diversity suits in the federal courts of New York, is not applicable to the filing of a third-party action.160

B. Constitutional Limitations on In Personam Jurisdiction
Last year's Survey discussed some of the relevant constitutional considerations necessary for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction in New York.lS1Our Survey deadline caused us to miss a
recent United States Supreme Court decision, Omni Capital International u. Rudolf Wolff & Co.,lb2which was decided on December
8, 1987. In Omni Capital, the Supreme Court held that a federal
district court in Louisiana lacked personal jurisdiction over nonres-

146. See Abramson, Diversity Jurisdiction Case Status May Become a Bit Harder to
Attain, Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1988,at 16, col. 1.
147. See Siegel, Significant Changes in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice Part 11:
Venue in Actions Against Corporations, 349 N.Y. ST. L. DIG.,Jan. 1989,at 1.
148. See Compucon Distribs. v. Cooper, 685 F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Schneider v.
Bahama Line, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); St. Charles Cable T.V., Inc. v. Eagle
Comtronics, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
149. See Howitz v. Oconefsky, 683 F. Supp. 959, 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
150. See Williams Erectors v. Mulach Steel, 684 F. Supp. 357,358 (E.D.N.Y. 1988);see
also N.Y. Bus. CORP.LAW 8 1312(a), (b) (McKinney 1986).
151. See Civil Practice, 1987 Survey, supra note 1, at 88-98.
152. 108 S. Ct. 404 (1987).
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ident defendants because there was no implied authorization for
nationwide service of process under the Commodity Exchange Act
provision permitting private causes of action and on the grounds
that the requirements of the Louisiana long-arm statute were not
satisfied.lK3This case is important for the New York practitioner
because whenever she files a federal question case, she should be
alert for a provision in the federal act which provides for nationwide service. In the absence of explicit or implicit authority to assert in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the
case may be dismissed unless basis is obtained under CPLR 302,1K4
which the New York Court of Appeals twice referred to in 1988 as
a long-arm statute that "does not provide for in personam jurisdiction in every case in which due process would permit it."lKK
C. Long-Arm Jurisdiction
~ ~ ~once
"The d i c t i o n known as long-arm. j u r i s d i c t i ~ n "has
again generated many cases during the Survey year. The Court of
Appeals almost buried the fiduciary shield doctrine in Kreutter u.
McFadden Oil Corp.,lK7and cut back on what constitutes a transaction of business for a defamation claim in Talbot v. Johnson
Newspaper Corp.lK8In Retail Software Services, Inc. v. Lashlee,lKn
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit clarified what kinds of
contacts the United States Supreme Court considers sufficient to
meet the "minimum contacts" standard.leOAlso, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held, in part, that a nonresident defendant's telephone contacts with New York were insufficient to
support jurisdiction.lel A review of other CPLR 3021e2 cases decided during the Survey year supports Professor Siegel's observa-

153. See Omni, 108 S. Ct. at 409.
154. N.Y. C P L R 302 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989).
155. Talbot v. Johnson Newspaper Corp., 7 1 N.Y.2d 827, 830, 522 N.E.2d 1027, 1029,
527 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731 (1988); Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 7 1 N.Y. 2d 460, 471, 522
N.E.2d 40,46, 527 N.Y.S.2d 195, 201 (1988).
156. Siegel, T h e AfPiction Known as Long A r m Jurisdiction, 199 N.Y.L.J., May 31,
1988, at 5, col. 3.
157. 7 1 N.Y.2d 460, 467-71, 522 N.E.2d 40, 44-46, 527 N.Y.S.2d 195, 199-200 (1988).
158. 7 1 N.Y.2d 827, 829-30, 522 N.E.2d 1027, 1028-29, 527 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731 (1988).
159. 854 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1988).
160. See Retail Software, 854 F.2d a t 23-24.
161. See Paradise Prods. v. Allmark Equip., 138 A.D.2d 470,471,526 N.Y.S.2d 119,121
(2d Dep't 1988).
162. N.Y. C P L R 302 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989).
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tion that "long-arm inquiries can leave the realm of the merely
monotonous and become intensely monotonous."16s
In CPC International, Inc. v. McKesson Corp.,le4the Court of
Appeals held that the fiduciary shield doctrine was not available to
defendants charged with tortious conduct in New York under
CPLR 302(a)(2).ls5 In Kreutter, the Court, without distinguishing
between contract and tort, held that the fiduciary shield doctrine
was unavailable to an individual in any case under CPLR 302.1es
In Kreutter, the individual was the principal with a corporate
agent acting for him in New York. The Court stressed that because
the plaintiff had obtained jurisdiction over the nondomiciliary corporate defendant, its individual employee (principal) would undoubtedly be the main witness of the company, and he would have
to come to New York to testify.ls7 Thus, the inconvenience he
would face if made an individual defendant was minimal.1es Furthermore, the Court noted that the equitable concerns which motivated development of the fiduciary shield doctrine "are amply protected by New York's long-arm statute, which does not confer
jurisdiction in every case where it is constitutionally permissible."le9 Finally, the Court stated in dicta that the fiduciary shield
doctrine is not "desirable as a matter of public
Brian McFadden was a neighbor of mine, and despite his untimely death in 1983, I am sure he joins me in wishing that the
Court's opinion in Kreutter had directed some discourse on the
distinction between tort and contract actions. In effect, the Court
buried the doctrine without analyzing its demise in terms of the
nature of the liability. The plaintiffs fraud claim was in tort (the
mere failure to perform a contract is not a fraud, but at the jurisdictional stage the Court was bound by the plaintiffs allegations),
but what about nondomiciliary individuals making contracts on
behalf of corporations who later breach them? Kreutter does not

163. Siegel, supra note 156, at 5.
164. 70 N.Y.2d 268, 514 N.E.2d 116, 519 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1987).
165. See CPC Int'l, 70 N.Y.2d at 287-88,514 N.E.2d at 125-26,519 N.Y.S.2d at 813-14.
166. See Kreutter, 71 N.Y.2d at 468-71, 522 N.E.2d at 44-46, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 199-200.
167. See id. at 471, 522 N.E.2d at 46, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 201.
168. See id.
169. Id. (fiduciary shield doctrine provides that an individual should not be subject to
jurisdiction for his dealings with the forum state when acting solely in his corporate
capacity).
170. Id.

Heinonline - - 40 Syracuse L. Rev. 98 1989

19891

Civil Practice

99

address the latter question, so a clever lawyer may try to circumvent the Court's holding by explicitly alleging claims in both contract and tort.171
In Talbot, the Court of Appeals, in a memorandum opinion,
held that two California defendants were not subject to in personam jurisdiction under the transaction of business clause in
CPLR 302(a)(1)lT2on a defamation claim because there were no
"purposeful activities" in New York.lT3 The Court, citing Asahi
Metal Industries v. Superior Court,174stated:
[wlhile appellants urge that jurisdiction may constitutionally be
premised on broader standards articulated by the United States
Supreme Court, the New York Long-arm statute . . . does not
provide for in personam jurisdiction in every case in which due
process would permit it.17=

The Court's reliance on Asahi, which was analyzed in last
year's Survey,176is curious because in that case five of the current
Supreme Court Justices agreed that the specific elements of foreseeability stressed by the Talbot Court are not necessary, except in
those rare cases in which "minimum requirements inherent in the
concept of 'fair play and substantial justice' . . . defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction . . . ."lT7Once again, the Court of Appeals is
reminding the practitioner that our state constitution has a due
process clause which may require more for assertions of jurisdiction than its federal counterpart.lT8The message is unfortunately
clear-the foreseeability element, a key one under the transaction
171. Your Survey author is not trying to encourage more litigation for the Court of
Appeals but anticipates further refinement of the fiduciary shield doctrine. It's been buried,
but the Court of Appeals will have to shovel some more dirt on it to convince the bar of its
permanent demise.
172. N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(l) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989).
173. See Talbot, 71 N.Y.2d a t 829, 522 N.E.2d a t 1028, 527 N.Y.S.2d a t 731 (alleged
defamatory statements were contained in letters to a university writer by a California father
dealing with incidents which occurred on the college campus during his daughter's attendance two years earlier-the defendant's newspaper quoted from the letters as well as a telephone interview with the daughter from California). Defamation is a cause of action excluded under CPLR 302(a)(2) and (a)(3). See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(2), (3) (McKinney 1972).
174. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
175. Talbot, 71 N.Y.2d a t 829-30, 522 N.E.2d a t 1029, 527 N.Y.S.2d a t 731 (citing
Asahi, 480 U.S. a t 102 (citations omitted)).
176. See Civil Practice, 1987 Survey, supra note 1, a t 88-97.
177. Id. a t 91.
178. See Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 408
N.Y.S.2d 39 (1978).
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of business clause of CPLR 302(a)(l), will not be given as much
effect as the statute envision^.'^^
In Retail Software, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit took a more expansive view of long-arm jurisdiction than the
Talbot Court.lso Although the defendant's contacts with New York
were limited (alleged misrepresentations on the fraud count were
made in California and in a long distance telephone call with Retail's president in New York), the Court, relying on a long line of
United States Supreme Court decision^,'^^ concluded that by selling franchises to be operated here, the defendants "stood to benefit from this entry into New York"la2 and, therefore, "reached
into" the State.lS3The Second Circuit also relied on New York's
interest in protecting its citizens from fraudulent franchise sales.184
In a similar line of cases, the federal courts for the Eastern and
Southern Districts upheld long-arm jurisdiction under the "contracts anywhere" clause of CPLR 302(a)(1),1s6and under the statute's "transaction of business" clause.1se
In Paradise Products v. Allmark Equipment,lS7the Appellate
Division, Second Department, held that two New Jersey corporations were not amenable to in personam jurisdiction in New
York.lSs The plaintiff had contacted one of the corporations by
telephone seeking to purchase a 500-gallon copper kettle. Another
corporation located the kettle and two of the plaintiffs representa-

179. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(l) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989).
180. See Retail Software, 854 F. Supp. a t 21-22.
181. See id. a t 22-23 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985);
World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); McGee v. Int'l Life Inc.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957)).
182. See id. a t 23.
183. See id.
184. See id. a t 24.
185. See Davidson Pipe Supply Co. v. G.W. Sales, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 332,333 (E.D.N.Y.
1988).
186. See First City Fed. Sav. Bank v. Dennis, 680 F. Supp. 579, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
Lest the reader assumes that there were no significant federal cases during the Survey year
where jurisdiction was declined, see First City Sav. v. Keener, 685 F. Supp. 58 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); Atlantic Corp. v. Polskie Linie Oceaniczne, 683 F. Supp. 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Coastal
Mart, Inc. v. Coastal Oil Co., 681 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Pelligrino v. Stratton
Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1164 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). In each of these cases, the defendant's contacts
with New York were so limited that it would be almost impossible t o conclude they could
foresee being hauled into our state to litigate.
187. 138 A.D.2d 470, 526 N.Y.S.2d 119 (2d Dep't 1988).
188. See Paradise Prods., 138 A.D.2d a t 471-72, 526 N.Y.S.2d a t 121.
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tives traveled to New Jersey, purchased the kettle, and arranged to
have it picked up in the Garden State rather than have it delivered
to New York. The 500-gallon copper kettle was later found to con- '
tain pinholes which rendered it useless for the plaintiffs business.
Because title passed in New Jersey and the plaintiff agreed to assume responsibility for shipping the product to New York (to save
the $150 delivery charge), the Appellate Division held that one defendant's knowledge that the kettle was destined for New York
~~~
the other dewas insuilicient to sustain j ~ r i s d i c t i o n .Similarly,
fendant's only contact with New York was one telephone call,
which would not support a jurisdictional base.lS0 Had the kettle
been delivered to New York, the result would have been different.
Thus, if your client is looking for a nonresident copper kettle, advise him to pay the delivery charge or brace yourself for a trip
across the Hudson to argue the merits of whether pinholes render
the kettle useless.

D. Statutory Requirements for Service of Summons
Last year's Survey continued to remind the practitioner that
New York State courts require strict compliance for service of
summons and notice.1s1 This is important because a defect in service dismisses the action,lS3and if the dismissal occurs after the
applicable statute of limitations has expired, there is no six-month
grace period under CPLR 205(a)lS9and the action is dead, which
means unhappy clients and higher malpractice rates. To avoid jurisdictional service challenges, always debrief the process server.
Be pound wise rather than penny foolish! If the defendant raises a
jurisdictional objection, successfully serve a second summons and
let the defendant move to dismiss it on the grounds that a prior
action is pending. By doing so, he must admit that the first action
is not jurisdictionally defective. Another solution suggested by the
Appellate Division, Second Department, is to re-serve the defendant in court before expiration of the statute of limitation^.^^'
Also, once service is complete, beware of an adversary who

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 470-71, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 120.
id. at 471-72, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
Civil Practice, 1987 Survey, supra note 1, at 111-20.
Siegel, Civil Procedure, 198 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, at S-24, col. 1.
id.; see also N.Y. CPLR 205(a) ( M c K i n e y Supp. 1989).
Kellner v. DeBushey, Ltd., 138 A.D.2d 460,526 N.Y.S.2d 115 (2d Dep't 1988).
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calls to request "more time" to submit an answer. Politely inform
him that your office policy is to liberally stipulate to "more time"
requests but only if your adversaries agree to waive all jurisdictional defenses. If he claims he "has not made that decision yet" or
"must talk to the client" remind him of how much you dislike
moving for default judgments, but that you have won a few of
them.IS6 In any event, follow up your conversation with a letter
and be sure not to stipulate away a good cause of action. With the
foregoing advice in mind, several Survey year service decisions
merit mention. In addition, the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. S ~ h l u n kde~~~
serves analysis because many New York practitioners are finding it
increasingly necessary to bring suit against corporations and individuals who reside in nations that are signatories to the Hague
Convention. This means compliance not only with New York service statutes such as CPLR 308,1e7Vehicle and TrafEc Law section
253,lS8Business Corporation Law section 307,1es etc., but also service of process requirements as directed by the Hague Convention.
Finally, this portion of the Survey will briefly comment on the "fax
phenomenon." The question of whether to fax or not to fax has
prompted several judges during the Survey year to write faxing

195. See Mulder v. Rockland Armor & Metal Corp., 140 A.D.2d 315, 527 N.Y.S.2d 550
(2d Dep't 1988), where the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that a default
judgment should not have been granted, on the basis of the defendant's nine-day default in
answering, at the time plaintiff moved to dismiss. See id. a t 316, 527 N.Y.S.2d a t 550. The
Appellate Division stated:
[i]n view of the relatively short period of the delay, the absence of any claim of
prejudice to the plaintiff, the existence of a possible meritorious defense, the absence of any willfulness on the appellant's part and the public policy in favor of
resolving cases on the merits, the Supreme Court should have denied the cross motion and granted the appellants leave to file a late claim.
Id. a t 316, 527 N.Y.S.2d a t 550-51 (citations omitted).
196. 108 S. Ct. 2104 (1988).
197. N.Y. CPLR 308 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989).
198. N.Y. VEH.& TRAF.
LAW3 253 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1989).
199. N.Y. Bus. CORP.LAW3 307 (McKinney 1986).
200. See Calabrese v. Springer Personnel of New York, Inc., 141 Misc. 2d 566, 534
N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1988); Infilco Degremont, Inc. v. Carland Constr. Co.,
200 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 27, 1988, a t 25, col. 2 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.).
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1. Service on a Natural Person
CPLR 308(1)201requires personal delivery of the summons and
notice to the defendant.202 Delivery of the summons to the wrong
person does not confer jurisdiction over a defendant even though
there is immediate r e d e l i ~ e r y .Subdivision
~~~
(1) is arguably the
most reliable and least likely to be challenged form of service; however, be sure to instruct your process server to "touch" the named
defendant with the summons.204The so-called "general vicinity"
exception-leaving the summons in the general vicinity of a person
to be served who resists service-is a limited exception.206If there
is any doubt that your process server satisfied the strict compliance requirements of CPLR 308(1), why risk the hazard of relying
solely on in-hand-service, particularly if the statute of limitations
is about to expire? If you need to be further convinced, read Phi
where the Appellate DiviSigma Phi Sorority, Inc. v. Sim0ns,2~~
reminds the
sion, Fourth Department, citing Macchia v. Russ0,2~~
practitioner that strict compliance means STRICT COMPLIANCE.208 Also, once a defendant submits a sworn denial that he
received the summons and notice, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to prove that the strict compliance requirements of CPLR 308(1)
were satisfied.209This means a traverse hearing where a judge is
more likely to credit the credibility of a defendant than a process
server who "performed this task about 100 times a week."210 Finally, what happens if your process server dies after service and
prior to a hearing as to whether service was properly effected? In
Gordon u. Nemeroff Realty Corp.,211 the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the &davit of service would be rep
-

p
-

201. N.Y. CPLR 308(1) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989).
202. See id.
203. See Macchia v. Russo, 67 N.Y.2d 592,594,496 N.E.2d 680,681,505 N.Y.S.2d 591,
593 (1986).
204. See Phi Sigma Phi Sorority, Inc. v. Simons, 137 A.D.2d 873,874,524 N.Y.S.2d 553,
554 (3d Dep't 1988).
205. See Thermidor v. Wyckoff Heights Hosp., 130 A.D.2d 653, 515 N.Y.S.2d 583 (2d
Dep't 1987); Selby v. Jewish Memorial Hosp., 130 A.D.2d 651, 652, 515 N.Y.S.2d 580, 582
(2d Dep't 1987).
206. 137 A.D.2d 873, 524 N.Y.S.2d 553 (3d Dep't 1988).
207. 67 N.Y.2d 592, 496 N.E.2d 680, 505 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1986).
208. See Phi Sigma, 137 A.D.2d a t 874, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
209. See Poet v. Kolenda, 142 A.D.2d 633,634,530 N.Y.S.2d 589,590 (2d Dep't 1988).
210. Phi Sigma, 137 A.D.2d a t 874, 524 N.Y.S.2d a t 554.
211. 139 A.D.2d 492, 526 N.Y.S.2d 595 (2d Dep't 1988).
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ceived as prima facie evidence of service, provided it was not conclusory or devoid of sufficient
This means the affidavit
must contain "sufficient factual detail and descriptive information
to establish prima facie that personal service was made."21s
Your best friend may be a process server, you may rejoice
when your only son marries a process server, but if you read the
1988 Survey cases on service of summons and notice, you will heed
my admonition to Never Trust a Process Server!
2. Leave and Mail

Leave and mail means that if one of the two steps is omitted,
then the service is invalid.214CPLR 308(2)216was amended again
during the Survey year21eto make it gender neutral and to require
that delivery and mailing be effected within twenty days of each
other.217 Also, service should be filed with the clerk of the court
designated in the summons "within twenty days of either such delivery or mailing, whichever is effected later."218 The amendments
became effective January 1, 1989.219
During the Survey year, one court has held that substituted
service of process on a doorman is valid only if he bars access to
the defendant's apartment.220The Appellate Division, First Department, held that the mailing requirement of CPLR 308(2) was
satisfied by mailing the summons to the defendant's post office box
where the plaintiff did not know the actual place of residence of
the defendant.221Also, the Appellate Term for the First Department ruled, in an issue of first impression, that leave and mail service was sufficient to commence criminal contempt proceedings.222

212. See Gordon, 139 A.D.2d a t 493, 526 N.Y.S.2d a t 596.
213. Id.
214. See Michaelson v. Hudson, 142 A.D.2d 560, 560,530 N.Y.S.2d 225, 226 (2d Dep't
1988).
215. N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989).
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 277 (codi216. See Act of June 20,1988, ch. 125,1988 MCKINNEY'S
fied at N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney Supp. 1989)).
217. See id.
218. Id. at 278.
219. See id.
220. See Reliance Audio Visual Corp. v. Bronson, 141 Misc. 2d 671,673,534 N.Y.S.2d
313, 315 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1988). A "dwelliig place" under CPLR 308(2) does not
extend to "the desk of the concierge." See id. a t 673, 534 N.Y.S.2d a t 314.
221. See Townsend v. Hanks, 140 A.D.2d 162, 527 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1st Dep't 1988).
222. See Department of Hous. Preservation & Dev. v. 24 West 132 Equities, Inc., 137
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This case is on appeal and should be affirmed by the Appellate
Division, First Department. We will highlight it in next year's
Survey.
3. Service on Defendant's Agent

CPLR 308(3)223permits service to be effected by delivery of
the summons to an "agent designated under Rule 318."224 In
Pabone v. Jon-Bar enterprise^:^^ the Appellate Division, Third
Department, held that service on a corporation by delivery of process to the Secretary of State is not personal delivery to the corporation or agent designated by CPLR 318.226In Shepard v. Morning
however, the Third Department upPride Manufacturing In~.,2~'
held service upon a law partner of an attorney who was registered
in New Jersey to accept process on the corporation's behalf?28The
practitioner is also reminded that a recent amendment to CPLR
318 provides that the writing in which the principal appoints his
agent must be executed and acknowledged in the same manner as
a deed.229
4. Nail and Mail

Service under CPLR 308(4)230is always hazardous because it
requires proof of "due diligence" to make service under subsections (1)and (2) of CPLR 308.231The due diligence requirements
were so rigidly construed during the Survey year as to merit the
conclusion that nail and mail service is "just plain unreliable serviCe.9Y232 If you must use CPLR 308(4), remember that failure of

Misc. 2d 459, 461-62, 524 N.Y.S.2d 324, 326-27 (Sup. Ct. App. T., 1st Dep't 1987).
223. N.Y. CPLR 308(3) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989).
224. See id.
225. 140 A.D.2d 872, 528 N.Y.S.2d 912 (3d Dep't 1988).
226. See Pabone, 140 A.D.2d a t 873, 528 N.Y.S.2d a t 913; see also N.Y. CPLR 318
(McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989).
227. 138 A.D.2d 74, 530 N.Y.S.2d 305 (3d Dep't 1988).
228. See Shepard, 138 A.D.2d a t 76, 530 N.Y.S.2d a t 307.
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 236 (codi229. See Act of July 15, 1987, ch. 115, 1987 MCKINNEY'S
fied a t N.Y. CPLR 308(3) (McKinney Supp. 1989)); see also Donaldson v. Melville, 124
A.D.2d 361, 507 N.Y.S.2d 301 (3d Dep't 1986) (agency must be express and not implied).
230. N.Y. CPLR 308(4) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989).
231. See id.
232. See Fanell, Good Old Unreliable-Service Under New York's 'Nail and Mail'
Statute, 196 N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1987, a t 1, col. 1;see also Bailey Corp. v. Gould, 143 A.D.2d
523, 533 N.Y.S.2d 34 (4th Dep't 1988); Wiley v. Lipset, 140 A.D.2d 336, 527 N.Y.S.2d 829
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the plaintiff to file proof of the substituted service is fatal,233and
have your process server make at least three serious attempts to
make service under CPLR 308(1) and (2) at the defendant's residence and office. This procedure may be costly, but it will probably
be good enough to keep your malpractice insurance rates
Also, CPLR 308(4) was amended during the Survey year236to
make it gender neutral and to require that delivery and mailing be
effected within twenty days of each other. In addition, the amendment requires that service be filed within twenty days of the mailing or delivery, whichever occurs last.236

5. Expedient Service
CPLR 308(5)237does not require proof of due diligence under
subsections (1) and (2), but it must be shown that service is "imp r a ~ t i c a b l e . "Thus,
~ ~ ~ in Bissinger v. Dibella,23ethe Appellate Division, Second Department, held that expedient service was not
available to a plaintiff because the papers in support of his application for CPLR 308(5) service were insufficient.240The Appellate
Division stressed the plaintiffs failure to provide evidentiary facts
establishing "fraud, deception, or misrepresentation or improper
c~nduct"~"which was calculated to prevent the plaintiff from ascertaining the defendant's address.

(2d Dep't 1988); Lukash v. O'Connell, 138 A.D.2d 957, 526 N.Y.S.2d 290 (4th Dep't 1988);
Cooney v. East Nassau Medical Group, 136 A.D.2d 392,528 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1st Dep't 1988).
233. See Wiley, 140 A.D.2d a t 336, 527 N.Y.S.2d a t 829 (defendant's motion to vacate
default judgment and to dismiss complaint granted and plaintiffs cross motion for leave to
file late proof of substituted service denied).
234. See Cooney, 136 A.D.2d a t 392, 528 N.Y.S.2d a t 364 (due diligence shown where
server's efforts to arrange for personal service on defendant a t his place of work were unavailing, and server had made repeated attempts to serve defendant a t his home, one occasion returning there a t the time he had been specifically advised that defendant would be
in).
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 278 (codi235. See Act of June 20,1988, ch. 125,1988 MCKINNEY'S
fied a t N.Y. CPLR 308(4) (McKinney Supp. 1989)).
236. See id.
237. N.Y. CPLR 308(5) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988).
238. See id.
239. 141 A.D.2d 595, 529 N.Y.S.2d 516 (2d Dep't 1988).
240. See Bissinger, 141 A.D.2d a t 596, 529 N.Y.S.2d a t 517.
241. Id.
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6. Related Service Tips

The Appellate Division, First Department, has held that the
more permissive service of process allowed when service is on a
corporation's agent under CPLR 311242will not be extended to service on a partnership under CPLR 310.243However, a general partner's managing agent may accept service for the partner~hip.2~~
The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed a trial
court's decision and applied the doctrine of immunity from service
to protect an Illinois defendant who voluntarily appeared 'at a dep. ~ Second
~ ~
Department also ruled that a
osition in New Y ~ r kThe
nonwillful bureaucratic delay by a town clerk, who failed to forward process to town officials, was a reasonable excuse for delay
~ ~ York Suand permitted opening of a default j ~ d g m e n t . 2New
preme Courts have held that a statute authorizing service of process to be made upon the New York Higher Education Assistance
and
Corporation is not sufficient for subject matter jurisdi~tion:~~
that a copy of a summons and complaint and notice of filing-sent
by registered mail, return receipt requested, and returned with envelope marked "returned to sender-forwarding time expired,"
and then filed with the clerk-was insufficient under Vehicle and
TrafEc Law section 253.248Also, a Family Court has ruled that outof-state personal service of process is impermissible in a proceeding brought under article 8 of the Family Court A ~ t . 2 ~ ~
Finally, we located an old First Department case, Lancaster v.
Kind~r:~O where the Appellate Division held that delay in filing
proof of service under CPLR 308 is merely a procedural irregularity, which is not jurisdictional, and can be corrected nunc pro tunc

242. N.Y. CPLR 311 (McKinney Supp. 1989).
243. See Cooney, 136 A.D.2d a t 392, 528 N.Y.S.2d a t 364; see also N.Y. CPLR 310
(McKinney 1972).
244. See Carol Management Corp. v. commissioner State of N.Y. Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 140 Misc. 2d 673, 531 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1988).
245. See Moreo v. Regan, 140 A.D.2d 313, 527 N.Y.S.2d 547 (2d Dep't 1988).
246. See Curtis v. Town of Clinton, 138 A.D.2d 445, 526 N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d Dep't 1988).
247. See Bell v. New York Higher Educ. Assistance Corp., 140 Misc. 2d 229, 530
N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1988).
248. See Harrington v. Victory Trucking Co., 141 Misc. 2d 327,533 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Sup.
Ct., Suffolk Co. 1988).
249. See Jane O.J. v. Peter L.J., 141 Misc. 2d 434, 532 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Family Ct., N.Y.
Co. 1988); see also N.Y. FAM.CT. Am Art. 8 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1989).
250. 98 A.D.2d 300, 471 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1st Dep't 1984).
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by the c0urt.2~'In Lancaster, the court stated: "the purpose of requiring filing of proof of service, along with the ten-day grace period, pertains solely to the time within which the defendant must
answer, and does not relate to the jurisdiction acquired by service 1
of the summons."262Although the Lancaster plaintiff appeared pro
se, the case may be helpful to some Survey readers.
7. The Hague Convention

Last year's Survey discussed the split of authority in state and
federal courts on the issue of whether the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra Judicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, an' international treaty known as the Hague
Convention, applied to service of process requirements in New
Y0rk.2~~
We stated that the conflicting approaches to the Conven.tion, on the state and federal levels, would have to be clarified by
the New York Court of Appeals and by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second
In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. S c h l ~ n k , the
2 ~ ~United States Supreme Court saved
our highest courts the effort by holding, albeit in dicta, that "compliance with the Convention is mandatory in all cases in which it
applies . . . ."268 Thus, by virtue of the supremacy clause, the
Hague Convention preempts inconsistent methods of service prescribed by state law in all cases to which it applies. In short, service abroad on a defendant who is a citizen of a nation that is a
signatory to the Convention must satisfy not only the requirements
of New York's CPLR, Business Corporation Law, and Vehicle and
TrafEc Law (or any other state service statute), but must also conform with the Hague service requirements. The Hague Convention
is not applicable to citizens of nations who have not ratified it or if
service is made upon the defendant, or the defendant's agent,

251. See Lancaster, 98 A.D.2d at 306, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
252. Id. at 306, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 577-78.
253. See Civil Practice, 1987 Survey, supra note 1, at 117-20. The United Kingdom,
Japan, Germany, France, Italy and twenty-one other nations are parties to the Hague
Convention.
254. See id.
255. 108 S . Ct. 2104 (1988).
256. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2111. "Thii language [in Article 1 of the Convention] is
mandatory." Id. at 2108; see also Davies & Weinstuck, Getting it Done: The Service of
Process Overseas, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 3, 1988, at 15, col. 4; Note, Committee Issues Nuts and
Bolts: Report on Service Abroad, N.Y. ST. B. NEWS,July 1988, at 5, col. 1.
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within the United States. Similarly, a contractual choice of forum
clause or a provision for an appointment by a foreign entity of an
agent for service of process in the United States will avoid having
to serve process abroad.
According to Schlunk, the law of the forum state determines
whether service abroad is necessary.267Thus, if state law, consistent with federal and state due process laws, permits domestic service upon a domestic subsidiary, the Convention does not apply.268
8. To Fax or Not to Fax
Two courts during the Survey year have permitted service papers upon an attorney through a facsimile (Fax) rnachine.ebeTo
conclude otherwise would, as Judge Lane puts it, "justify the blunt
observation about the aw which Charles Dickens put in the mouth
of [Mr. Bumble in] Oliver Twist."2eoNonetheless, there are serious
objections to the Fax phenomenon, particularly if it is authorized
by the Legislature for service of process purposes.'81 Unlimited
faxing should not be dumped on the bar without full consideration
of a few potential pitfalls. The Survey reader is encouraged to ponder the following: (1)"the hidden fax number" (lawyers may withdraw their fax numbers when they do not want to be served); (2)

257. See Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. a t 2108.
258. We could devote much more of the Survey to analyzing the Hague Convention.
Fortunately for the bench and bar, however, Professor Mark Davies of Fordham Law School
and Attorney Robert L. Haig of the New York bar have authored Service of Process
Abroad! A Nuts and Bolts Guide which Professor Davies advises will be published in the
December, 1988 Federal Rules Decisions. The article is also available from the New York
State Bar Association's Committee on Federal Courts. Any New York lawyer representing a
plaintiff suing a foreign national should read this piece. Failure to do so may result in a
jurisdictional dismissal that will be fatal if the applicable statute of limitations has run.
Further information regarding service abroad under the Hague Convention is available by
telephoning the State Department in Washington, D.C. The numbers are as follows: (1)
African Services Division, (202) 647-4994; (2) East Asia and Pacific Services Division, (202)
647-3675; European and Canadian Division, (202) 647-3444; Inter-American Division, (202)
647-3712; and the Near East and South Asian Division, (202) 647-3926. Identify the country
that your defendant is a citizen of, and, without referring to your malpractice insurance
company, ask for information. Next year's Survey will discuss the expected deluge of New
York cases analyzing the Convention.
259. See Calabrese v. Springer Personnel of N.Y., Inc., 141 Mic. 2d 566,534 N.Y.S.2d
83 (N.Y.C. 'Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1988); Infilco Degremont, Inc. v. Carland Constr. Co., 200
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 27, 1988, a t 25, col. 2 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.).
260. See Calabrese, 141 Misc. 2d a t 567, 534 N.Y.S.2d a t 84.
261. See generally Annual Report of O5ce of Court Administration's CPLR Committee, Dec. 1988 (available from author).
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many attorneys do not have fax machines (should we have
mandatory fax purchases as a condition for admission to the bar);
(3) the "dead sea scroll theory" (what to do with the 8000 pages of
overnight faxed material); (4) how to certify receipt of faxed
materials (your adversary "ducks" your certification telephone
call); (5) midnight fax transmissions, or worse yet, fax transmissions to your summer hideaway on Cape Cod; (6) is the fax technology up to snuff; (7) certain fax documents are not clear on the
machine (handwritten inserts frequently are not legible); (8)
whether service by fax eliminates the five day mailing requirements under the CPLR; (9) time of receipt of faxed documents can
be manipulated; and (10) whether faxing is the best form of actual
notice. These and many other obstacles to service by the userfriendly facsimile machine should be considered.
IV. FORUMNONCONVENIENS
Even if a New York court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction, CPLR 327(a)262gives the court discretionary power to
dismiss the
Under CPLR 327(b),264however, dismissal will
not be allowed where the action arises out of a contract agreement
or undertaking to which section 5-1402 of the General Obligations
Law266applies if the parties have agreed that New York law will
govern.266Several decisions during the Survey year apply subdivision (a) of CPLR 327, and the United States Supreme Court's de. ~ ~subdi~
cision in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh c o r ~affects
vision (b) of the statute.
A. CPLR 327(a)

CPLR 327(a)26spermits a court to stay or dismiss any action if
it feels that "in the interest of substantial justice the action should
be heard in another forum."26s The Court of Appeals has held,
262. N.Y. CPLR 327(a) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
263. See id.
264. N.Y. CPLR 327(b) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
LAW3 5-1402 (McKinney Supp. 1989).
265. N.Y. GEN.OBLIG.
266. See generally 1 J . WEINSTEIN,
supra note 140, at 3 327.04 (revised edition 1988 by
Jay C. Carlisle).
267. 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988).
268. N.Y. CPLR 327(a) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
269. Id.
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however, that the availability of an alternative forum is not an absolute precondition for dismissal.270The Court also ruled during
the Survey year that a court may stay or dismiss a case under
CPLR 327(a), in whole or in part, only upon motion of a ~ a r t y . 2 ~ '
In VSL Corp. v. Dunes Hotels & C a ~ i n o s , 2the
~ ~Court of Appeals held that "a court does not have the authority to invoke the
doctrine on its own motion."273This decision is puzzling as a forum
non conveniens objection has traditionally been considered tantamount to a motion for dismissal on subject matter grounds under
CPLR 3211(a)(2),274which clearly can be raised sua sponte by the
~ o u r t . 2Also,
~ ~ in an era of conserving judicial resources, why permit out-of-state and foreign parties and their lawyers, in the absence of a forum selection clause, to use New York's courts without
the judiciary having some say as to docket control?276
Also of note is last year's Survey discussion of Carlenstolpe v.
Merck & Co.277In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit ruled, on an issue of first impression, that a federal district
court's order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint on forum
non conveniens grounds was not an appealable order under 28
U.S.C. fi 1291.278During the Survey year, however, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Chasser v. Achille

270. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 467 N.E.2d 245, 478
N.Y.S.2d 597 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985).
271. See VSL Corp. v. Dunes Hotels & Casinos, 70 N.Y.2d 948, 519 N.E.2d 617, 524
N.Y.S.2d 671 (1988).
272. 70 N.Y.2d 948, 519 N.E.2d 617, 524 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1988).
273. VSL Corp., 70 N.Y.2d a t 949, 519 N.E.2d a t 617, 524 N.Y.S.2d a t 671.
274. N.Y. CPLR 3211(a)(2) (McKinney 1970).
275. See D. SIEGEL,supra note 79, a t 3 28.
276. Several other Survey year decisions are of interest, including Carve1 Corp. v. Ross
Distribs., 137 A.D.2d 758, 524 N.Y.S.2d 469 (2d Dep't 1988) and Scottish Air Int'l v. British
Caledonia Group P.L.C., 860 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1988). However, I modestly refer the Survey
reader to my 1988 revision of CPLR 327 in the Weinstein, Korn & Miller treatise on New
York Civil Practice for a more thorough discourse on CPLR 327(a).
277. 819 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987).
278. See Carlenstolpe, 819 F.2d a t 36. The Third, Fifth, Sixth and District of Columbia
Circuits have also ruled that district court orders denying motions on forum non conveniens
grounds are nonappealable. See id. a t 33; see also Partrederiet Treasure Saga v. Joy Mfg.
Co., 804 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1986); Rosenstein v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 769 F.2d 352
(6th Cir. 1985); Nalls v. Rolls Royce, Ltd., 702 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
970 (1983); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator, Ltd., 709 F.2d 190 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983). The Fourth Circuit, however, has ruled that a district court
order denying a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds is appealable. See
Kontoulas v. A.H. Robins Co., 745 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1984).
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Lauro Lines27gto determine if a federal appeals court has interlocutory authority to review a federal judge's ruling that a personal
injury and wrongful death suit must be tried in United States
courts and not a foreign forum. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said no, and, citing Carlenstolpe, pointed out that they
had not considered the applicability of the Cohen doctrine280to
the denial of a motion to dismiss on the basis of a contractual forum selection clause.281We will discuss this interesting development in next year's Survey.
A postscript to our forum non conveniens discussion is that
the
case, which never fully made it to the United States
Supreme Court, was heard on appeal during the week of November
1, 1988 before the highest court in India.283The district judge
hearing the case was removed for ordering Union Carbide to pay
$350 million in damages without bothering to establish the company's liability before announcing his verdict.284

'

B. CPLR 327(b)

Subdivision (b) of CPLR 327 was added in 1984285in order to
render the doctrine of forum non conveniens inapplicable to certain commercial contract cases involving large monetary
amounts.286Generally, choice of law clauses in non-consumer contracts involving at least $250,000 are binding, even if the contract
bears no reasonable relation to New Y ~ r k Similarly,
. ~ ~ ~ choice of
forum clauses control in non-consumer contracts for which a choice
of law has been made if the contract involves a t least $1 million
and the foreign corporation or nonresident defendant has agreed to
the jurisdiction of New York courts. This is true even if the parties
are nondomiciliaries and the cause of action bears no relationship

279. 844 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 217 (1988); see also Note, Justices
to Decide Issue in Achille Lauro Hijacking, 200 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 12, 1988, a t 1, col. 3.
280. See Chasser, 844 F.2d a t 52 (exception to the final order rule).
281. See id. a t 54.
282. See I n re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), modified sub
nom. Plaintiffs v. Union Carbide Corp., 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
283. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1988, a t D15.
284. See id.
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 1407 (codi285. See Act of July 19,1984, ch. 421, 1984 MCKINNEY'S
fied a t N.Y. CPLR 327(b) (McKinney Supp. 1989)).
286. See id.
287. See N.Y. GEN.OBLIG.LAW3 5-1401 (McKinney Supp. 1989).
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to New York. The choice of law and forum selection provisions are
implemented by General Obligations Law sections 5-1401 and 51402 respectively.2s8
CPLR 327(b) allows big spenders, wherever they are located in
the world, to use New York courts. Nevertheless, in Stewart Orthe United States Supreme
ganization, Inc. v. Ricoh C0rp.,2~~
Court held that forum selection clauses binding in a state court
will not be given the same binding effect in federal court.2D0The
Court ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the federal venue transfer
statute, supersedes the absolute requirements of a state forum non
conveniens doctrine in the federal
Thus, a forum selection clause, pursuant to CPLR 327(b), will at best be factored in as
one of several criteria under the federal venue statute. Professor
Youngblood argues that Stewart is good news for CPLR 327(b)
agreements;292however, the Supreme Court may have added to the
. ~ example,
~ ~
if California and
litigation explosion in New Y ~ r kFor
Texas corporations stipulate under CPLR 327(b) to have a matter
heard in a New York Supreme Court and Texas commences an action here, California can remove it to federal court and then try to
venue it out of New York or even dismiss it.2D4The same is true for
288. See id. $5 5-1401, 5-1402.
289. 108 S. Ct. 2239 (1988).
290. See Stewart, 108 S. Ct. a t 2244.
291. See id. Stewart involved both choice of law and choice of New York forums; however, Stewart filed suit in Alabama. Ricoh, relying on the clause, moved to transfer the case
to New York under 28 U.S.C. !j 1404(a) or to dismiss it under 28 U.S.C. 1406. The district
court would not enforce the forum selection clause because it concluded it must apply Alabama law, which invalidated forum selection clauses. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit reversed on the ground that the enforceability of such clauses in
federal courts was a matter of federal rather than state law. In a split opinion, the Supreme
Court affirmed and remanded the case to the district court for determination of the effect to
be given to the forum selection clause under section 1404(a). See id. a t 2245.
292. See Youngblood, Forum Selection Clauses in New York Affected by High Court's
Decision, 200 N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1988, a t 1, col. 3 (Professor Youngblood argues that the
Stewart decision will make it more difficult for parties to subvert forum selection clauses by
bringing suit in a hostile forum.).
293. See Carlisle, Simplified Procedures for Court Determination Under New York's
Civil Practice Law and Rules, 54 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 95, 96 n.5 (citing New York state
caseload statistics from CASELOAD
A c m ~ r nREPORTING
SYSTEMOF THE OFFICEOF COURT
ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNIFIED
COURTSYSTEMOF THE STATEOF NEWYORK(1987)).
294. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406 (1982). Prior to Stewart, if Texas filed in New
York, California would be absolutely required to litigate here in state or federal court. After
Stewart, a 327(b) forum selection clause will no longer be binding in federal court. Thus, a
defendant seeking to avoid the clause in a diversity action can remove to federal court and
then try to venue the case elsewhere.
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two foreign nationals. Clearly the Legislature's desire to open New
York's doors to a hearing on the merits of certain types of big commercial litigation has been thwarted. We can expect, however, a
substantial increase in Rule 12(b)(3)296venue litigation, which your
Survey author eagerly awaits!29s

Of the many Survey year decisions interpreting and applying
Article I1 of the CPLR, the following should be of interest. The
United States Supreme Court's decision in Felder u. C a ~ e y ~on~ '
the inapplicability of notice of claim requirements for civil rights
actions filed in state courts is analyzed as are several pertinent notice of claim decisions by New York State courts. Also, the Court
of Appeals ruled, in Jackson v. L.P. Transportation Co.:08 that
the No-Fault Law does not alter the general rule that the time for
bringing a common law negligence action begins to run from the
date of the occurrence, or justify an exception for personal injury
claims based upon the negligent operation of a motor vehicle.290

A. CPLR 203(b)(5): Delivery to Sheriff or County Clerk
CPLR 203(b)(5)300is a practitioner's blessing. If the tick-tick
of the statute of limitations clock has almost run, properly serve
the Sheriff, or appropriate county clerk, if the action is to be tried
within the City of New York, and the clock will be tolled for sixty
days so that the deep-pocket defendant can be served. If you need
the extra sixty days, be sure to comply with the "exacting" requirements of 203(b)(5).301

295. FED.R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3).
296. The U.S. Supreme Court's analysis of the weight to be given forum selection
clauses, asserted as the grounds for a venue transfer, is likely to result in federal courts
denying effect to these clauses, even in cases where New York law is clearly controlling. The
Court itself acknowledged this possibility. One method of keeping the case in New York
State courts, where the forum selection clause is binding, is to provide for nonremoval to
federal court. But can a party stipulate away his removal rights?
297. 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988); see also Schwartz, Ruling on Section 1983 Notice of Claim
Reviewed, 200 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 5,1988, a t 3, col. 1; Steinglass, Court's Notice-of-Claim Ruling
May Encourage Section 1983 Cases, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 15, 1988, a t 14, col. 5.
298. 72 N.Y.2d 975, 530 N.E.2d 1282, 534 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1988).
299. See Jackson, 72 N.Y.2d a t 975, 530 N.E.2d a t 1282, 534 N.Y.S.2d a t 362.
300. N.Y. CPLR 203(b)(5) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989).
301. See Civil Practice, 1987 Survey, supra note 1, a t 121-22 (discussing exacting re-
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Two Survey year decisions of the Appellate Division, Second
Department, should be of interest. 1n' Johnson Matthey, Ltd. u.
Farre11,302 the Appellate Division gave the plaintiff a break and
held that the three-year statute for conversion was tolled even
though the plaintiff did not intend that service of process actually
be attempted by the Sheriff.303The inadvertent failure to request
on the summons and notice that the Sheriff serve the pleadings
was not fatal. Believe it or not, the plaintirs summons was
stamped "Not For Service" by the friendly Sheriffs Department.
In Stein v. Blatte,304 the Second Department reminded the bar
that rules for determining when the statute of limitations stops
running do not apply to conditional time periods created by the
court or by statute.306Similarly, a one-year time period in which to
commence an action against the Port Authority is a condition precedent rather than a statute of limitations and cannot be extended
by tolling provisions under 203(b).306

B. CPLR 205(a): Six Month Extension
CPLR 205(a)307provides that if a timely commenced claim is
terminated in any manner other than by voluntary discontinuance,
dismissal for want of prosecution, or a final judgment on the merits, the plaintiff may commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences within
six months after termination of the action.308Of course, the Court
of Appeals has held that the extra six months is not applicable
when an action is dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction based
on defective service because the original action was never started
for purposes of CPLR 205(a).309In Fleming v. Long Island Rail-

quirements of CPLR 203(b)(5)).
302. 141 A.D.2d 68, 533 N.Y.S.2d 87 (2d Dep't 1988).
303. See Johnson Matthey, 141 A.D.2d a t 70,533 N.Y.S.2d a t 88. CPLR 203(b)(5) provides only for a 60-day toll when persona1 delivery of summons with notice is contemplated,
and must be accomplished within 60 days after the applicable statute of limitations runs.
See N.Y. CPLR 203(b)(5) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989).
'
304. 140 A.D.2d 685, 528 N.Y.S.2d 882 (2d Dep't 1988).
305. See Stein, 140 A.D.2d a t 687, 528 N.Y.S.2d a t 883.
306. See Savino v. Demiglia, 133 A.D.2d 858, 519 N.Y.S.2d 384 (2d Dep't 1988).
307. N.Y. CPLR 205(a) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1989).
308. See id.
309. See Siegel, supra note 192; Civil Practice, 1987 Survey, supra note 1,a t 111n.278.
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road,S1° the plaintiff was injured when he fell between the platform
and a railroad car. The action was timely commenced by service of
summons and complaint, but was dismissed for failure to comply
with provisions of the Public Health Law.311The Court of Appeals
held that the second action, commenced within six months of the
dismissal of the original action, but not more than six years after
the accrual of the cause of action, was not time barred because it
fell within the six-month grace period of CPLR 205(a).312In Butler
v. Caldwell & Cook,SIShowever, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held the grace period to be inapplicable because the
plaintiffs claims were not terminated, but merely conditionally
dismissed with leave to amend.314
C. CPLR 214-a: The Continuous Treatment Exception
The last two Survey articles have discussed the continuing
treatment doctrine with respect to the two years and six-month
statute of limitations under CPLR 214-a315for medical, dental and
podiatric malpractice actions.316We pointed out that the rationale
underlying the doctrine is the existence of a "continuing trust and
confidence" that warrants the tolling of the limitations period.s17
During the Survey year, the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that what's good for doctors is good for lawyers. In
Stampfel v. E ~ k h a r d t the
, ~ ~Second
~
Department referred to a
"continuing representation" doctrine, which it ruled was sufficient
to toll the running of the statute of limitations on landowners' legal malpractice claim against an attorney who represented them in
their purchase of a tract.s19The holding was based on the fact that
the attorney's firm continued to represent the landowners in a
later action for adverse possession brought by adjoining landown-

310. 72 N.Y.2d 998, 530 N.E.2d 1291, 534 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1988).
311. See Fleming v. long Island R.R., 130 A.D.2d 59,518 N.Y.S.2d 144 (2d Dep't 1988).
312. See Fleming, 72 N.Y.2d at 998, 530 N.E.2d at 1291, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
313. 142 A.D.2d 962, 530 N.Y.S.2d 729 (4th Dep't 1988).
314. See Butler, 142 A.D.2d at 963-64, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
315. N.Y. CPLR 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1989).
316. See Civil Practice, 1987 Survey, supra note 1, at 124-27; Civil Practice, 1986 Survey, supra note 1, at 106.
317. See id. .
318. 143 A.D.2d 184, 531 N.Y.S.2d 814 (2d Dep't 1988).
319. See Stampfel, 143 A.D.2d at 185, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
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er~.9~O
The Stampfel opinion follows the Court of Appeals' lead in
which concluded that the conBoard of Education v. Sa~gent,9~l
tinuous treatment doctrine is available in professional malpractice
~ a s e s . 9 ~The
~
doctrine also applies to most fiduciary
relati~nships.~~~

D. CPLR 214-c: The Discovery Rule
Two years ago, the Survey piece on New York Civil Practice
which applies a date of disanalyzed newly enacted CPLR 214-~,9~'
covery accrual to some substance exposure cases and revives certain other substance claims.s25We predicted that New York courts
would liberally construe the statutory reference to "substance."
During the Survey year, two courts did so in Burdick u. AfrimetIn Burdick, the
Indussa, Inc.S26and Prego v. City of New Y0rk.9~~
Supreme Court of Onondaga County held that the use of 214-c in
reviving claims for the latent effects of exposure to "tungsten-carbide" was not limited to the pure compound of tungsten and carbon alone, but included a category of the substance known as
"hard metals disease."s28 In Prego, Kings County Supreme Court
ruled that the statute of limitations on a physician's $175 million
negligence suit against the City of New York for contracting AIDS
from a contaminated needle began to run from the date she discovered, or should have discovered, symptoms of the disease and not
from the date she was stuck by the needle.52s The Prego court

320. See id.
321. 7 1 N.Y.2d 21, 517 N.E.2d 1360, 523 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1987); see also Barker, The
Badly Performed Contract, 200 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 28, 1988, at 3, col. 1 (discussing Board of
Educ. v. Sargent).
322. See Sargent, 7 1 N.Y.2d at 21, 517 N.E.2d at 1360, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
323. See McCabe v. RMJ Sec., 200 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 1988, at 21, col. 6 (Sup. Ct., N.Y.
Co.).
324. N.Y. CPLR 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1989).
325. See Civil Practice, 1986 Survey, supra note 1, at 70-72; see also Brennan, Causal
Chains and Statistical Links: T h e Role of Scientific Uncertainty i n Hazardous Substance
Litigation, 73 CORNELLL. REV. 469 (1988).
326. 138 Misc. 2d 598, 525 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga Co. 1988).
327. 141 Misc. 2d 709, 534 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1988); see also Anderson,
Court Upholds Aids Doctor's Right to Sue, 200 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3, 1988, at 1, col. 3; N.Y.
Times, Nov. 3,1988, at B-7 (discussing AIDS-tainted blood as toxic substance); N.Y. T i e s ,
Dec. 9,1988, at A-31 (discussing $3.9 million award b y jury in Wisconsin AIDS blood transfusion case).
328. See Burdick, 138 Misc. 2d at 598, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
329. See Prego, 141 Misc. 2d at 711, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
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stressed that the Legislature did not enumerate the applicable
"substances" to which the discovery rule would apply and, therefore, "the very plain meaning of the underlined material indicates
that any 'substance' was intended."330

E. CPLR 217: When is the Four Month Time Period
Applicable?
Generally, Article 78 proceedings are subject to a four-month
statute of limitations. However, some actions, such as those against
zoning boards and other agencies, have lesser time limits. The four
month period begins to run when the petitioner is notified of the
action to be taken against her, and not when the adverse determination is actually taken.331 Thus, in Waterside Associates v. New
York State Department of Environmental Conser~ation,3~~
the
Court of Appeals, in a four to three decision, held the petitioner's
claim to be time barred because the proceeding was not commenced within four months from the time of respondent's refusal
to honor an alleged "non-wetlands letter" pertaining to petitioner's
land.333The respondent's response to the application was a form
letter that did not unequivocally abrogate a prior "non-wetlands"
letter. Consequently, the practitioner should review all correspondence and papers relating to the Article 78 client's relationship
with the targeted respondent in order to be sure the four month
period, or less, has not expired.

F. Notice of Claim Provisions
Last year's Survey distinguished notice of claim provisions
from statutes of limitations and noted that the plaintiff must plead
and prove compliance with conditions precedent.334Several Survey
year opinions illustrate that notice of claim provisions must be

330. Id. at 712, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
331. See Civil Practice, 1987 Survey, supra note 1, at 127-28; see also Goldstein v.
Niagara Falls Memorial Medical Center, 143 A.D.2d 515, 533 N.Y.S.2d 40 (4th Dep't 1988);
Bonar v. ShaEer, 140 A.D.2d 153, 527 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1st Dep't 1988); Sutherland v. Village
of Suffern, 139 A.D.2d 728, 527 N.Y.S.2d 479 (2d Dep't 1988).
332. 72 N.Y.2d 1009, 531 N.E.2d 636, 534 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1988).
333. See Waterside Assocs., 72 N.Y.2d at 1010,531 N.E.2d at 637,534 N.Y.S.2d at 91516.
334. See Civil Practice, 1987 Survey, supra note 1, at 133-34.
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Similarly, in Bacelokonstantis v. Nichstrictly complied
ols,336the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that plaintiffs service of claim on a city agency was not timely because it
was one day late.337
On a positive note, in Felder v. C a ~ e y , 3the
~ ~United States
Supreme Court held that a Wisconsin state notice requirement,
such as are frequently condition precedents to the maintenance of
tort actions against municipalities and government entities in New
York, could not be applied in federal civil rights actions brought in
state
Prior to Felder, there was no question that state
notice of claim provisions were not binding in federal court. This
opinion overrules the New York Court of Appeals' decision in 423
S. Salina St., Inc. u. City of S y r a ~ u s e , ~which
' ~ went the wrong
way. Nonetheless, when joining state and federal claims in one action be sure to comply with applicable condition precedents for the
state cause of action. Even after Felder, there is nothing to stop a
lawyer from filing a notice of claim in a civil rights action brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Who knows, counsel may be able to settle
the case without serving a summons and complaint.

G. Miscellaneous
Last year's Survey promised to report on the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Medwesco
enterprise^.^" In Bendix, the Court examined Ohio's absence statute, which is similar to New York's CPLR 207342toll for absent
defendants, requiring foreign corporations to designate an agent
for service of process in the State. Failure to do so meant the tolling provision would not apply which forced foreign corporations to

335. See Moran v. Vaccaro, 684 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Carnesi v. State, 140
A.D.2d 912, 529 N.Y.S.2d 214 (3d Dep't 1988); Combs v. Village o f Freeport, 139 A.D.2d
688, 527 N.Y.S.2d 443 (2d Dep't 1988); Castro v. City o f New York, 139 A.D.2d 687, 527
N.Y.S.2d 441 (2d Dep't 1988).
336. 141 A.D.2d 482, 529 N.Y.S.2d 111 (2d Dep't 1988).
337. See Bacelokonstantis, 141 A.D.2d at 482, 529 N.Y.S.2d a t 111. But see ESO v.
Westchester County, 141 A.D.2d 542, 529 N.Y.S.2d 155 (2d Dep't 1988) (leave granted t o
serve late notice o f claim).
338. 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988).
339. See Felder, 108 S. Ct. at 2307.
340. 68 N.Y.2d 474, 503 N.E.2d 63, 510 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1986).
341. 108 S. Ct. 2218 (1988);see also Barker, New York Practice (Statute of Limitation
in Fraud, Death), 200 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 26, 1988, a t 3, col. 1.
342. N.Y. C P L R 207 (McKinney 1972).

Heinonline

--

40 Syracuse L. Rev. 119 1989

120

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 40:77

submit to general jurisdiction in Ohio. The Supreme Court ruled
that the Ohio statute violated the interstate commerce clause.343
We also promised to track Greenwood v. State Office of Mental
Health344 and Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co.346 We predicted
Hymowitz would be affirmed by the Appellate Division, First Department, and it
We also believed that Greenwood would
be reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which
it
Other interesting Survey year decisions include Banks Trust
Co. v. Rhoades,s4*where the Second Circuit declared that the statute of limitations for civil racketeering actions is four years for
each separate injury sustained under the RICO
and Singer
v. Eli Lilly &
where a New York State Supreme Court judge
declined to adopt federal practice and dismissed a DES claim for
late filing.361 Unlike federal practice, Justice Gammerman held
that the expiration of New York's one year revival statute was not
tolled by the fact that a class action had been filed during the revival period.362
VI. RES JUDICATA
(CLAIMPRECLUSION)
AND COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL (ISSUE
PRECLUSION)
The doctrines of claim preclusion3" and issue preclusion354

343. See Bendix, 108 S. Ct. a t 2221.
344. 645 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding plaintiffs action not commenced for
statute of limitations purposes on the date his complaint was placed in a night depository
box maintained by the clerk of the court).
345. 136 Misc. 2d 482, 518 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1987) (challenge to revival statute of CPLR
214-c rejected).
346. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 139 A.D.2d 437, 526 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1st Dep't
1988).
347. See Greenwood v. State Office of Mental Health, 842 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).
348. 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988).
349. See Banks Trust, 859 F.2d a t 1102; see also Squiers, 4-Year Statute for Civil
RICO Actions, 200 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 7, 1988, a t 1, col. 3.
d -N.Y.S.2d -(Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1988).
350. -Misc. 2
351. See id.; see also Anderson, DES Claim Dismissed for Late Filing, 200 N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 7, 1988, at 1, col. 5.
352. See Singer, -Misc. 2d a t , -N.Y.S.2d a t -.
353. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits bars a subsequent action between the parties, or persons in privity with them, from relitigating the
same cause of action. I t bars the relitigation of claims which might have been litigated as
well as those which actually were litigated. See O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353,
429 N.E.2d 1158, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1981); Smith v. Russell Sage College, 54 N.Y.2d 185,
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were liberally applied during the Survey year in a variety of cont e x t ~In
. ~fact,
~ ~New York courts issue at least twenty publishable
"res judicata" opinions each month! Before discussing the most
important 1988 opinions, a few thoughts on terminology are
merited.
In its broadest sense, the term "res judicata" has been used to
refer to a variety of concepts, including collateral estoppel, dealing
with preclusive effects of a judgment on subsequent litigation.366
Claim preclusion is the doctrine that "once a claim is brought to a
final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based on sufficient
theories or if seeking a different remedy."367 Therefore, use of the
term res judicata for what is intended to be claim preclusion has
the potential for confusion. Similarly, collateral estoppel is one of a
number of doctrines collectively referred to as res j ~ d i c a t a , 3and
~~
the bench and bar frequently use the two terms inter~hangeably~~~
which sometimes is ambiguous. Thus, modern approaches use the
"new" terminology as suggested by Professor Vestal over twenty
~ ~ l the
years ago.3s0The Restatement (Second) of J u d g m e n t ~ and

429 N.E.2d 746, 445 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1981).
354. As the doctrine of issue preclusion now stands, a valid final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction prevents relitigation by the parties or their
privies of matters of fact or law actually litigated or necessarily determined in the earlier
action. Two prerequisites must be met to apply the doctrine in New York State courts.
"First, the identical issue necessarily must have been decided in the prior action and be
decisive of the present action, and second, the party to be precluded . . must have had a
full and fair opportunity to contact the prior determination." Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65
N.Y.2d 449, 453, 482 N.E.2d 63, 66, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584, 588 (1985).
355. For examples of claim preclusion being applied, see Bray v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 851 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1988); Kirkland v. City of Peekskill, 828 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1987);
d -N.Y.S.2d -(Sup. Ct., Nassau Co.
Mauncuso v. Celotex Corp., -Misc. 2
1988); Spargo v. State Comm'n on Gov't Integrity, 140 A.D.2d 26, 531 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d
Dep't 1988). For examples of issue preclusion being applied, see O'Malley v. Nassau County
Medical Center, 686 F. Supp. 62 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Rube1 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 681 F. Supp. 151
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); People v. Moore, 142 A.D.2d 895, 531 N.Y.S.2d 397 (3d Dep't 1988);
Trivizas v. City of New York, 137 A.D.2d 455, 524 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1st Dep't 1988).
356. See Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should the Doctrine of Issue
Preclusion Make a n Administrative or Arbitral Determination Binding in a Court of Law?,
L. REV.63, 65 (1986).
55 FORDHAM
357. Id. a t 66 n.13.
358. See id. a t 63 n.2.
359. See id. a t 65-66 nn.12-16.
360. See Vestal, Extent of Claim Preclusion, 54 IOWA
L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1968); Vestal,
Procedural Aspects of Res Judicata/Preclusion, 1 U. TOL.L. REV.15, 28 (1969).
17-19 (1982).
361. See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS

.
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New York Court of AppealsSB2have adopted use of the terms
"claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion," but on occasion even a
distinguished judge or highly respected member of the bar reverts
to the "old" terminology. These relapses are usually a sign of old
age and should be avoided by the young at heart. Consistent use of
the terms claim preclusion and issue preclusion will benefit the
bench and bar.

A. Claim Preclusion
Claim preclusion cases during the Survey year bar the relitigation of issues that might have been litigated as well as those that
were actually litigated.sBsCourts during the Survey year continued
to follow the "transactional analysis" approach first enunciated by
the New York Court of Appeals in Reilly v. Reid.Su The most interesting extension of the "might have been raised" requirement is
found in Ruiz v. Commissioner of the Department of Transportawhere the Court of Appeals for the
tion of the City of New Y0rk,9~~
Second Circuit applied the doctrine of claim preclusion to bar appellants from challenging the validity of summonses issued to them
on fourth amendment grounds.3BBThe Second Circuit also expanded the New York Court of Appeals' definition of privity as set
forth in Green v. Santa Fe Industrie~.~~'
The Second Circuit went
so far as to analyze privity in terms of the fact that different parties in the first and second actions had the same attorney. Although "not conclusive on the issue of privity," this fact was surprisingly of "singular significance" for the court. In Boronow v.
Boron0w,9~~
the New York Court of Appeals applied claim preclusion to bar relitigation of an issue of title ownership that could
have been but was not litigated in the underlying matrimonial
action.3BB

362. See American Ins. Co. v. Messenger, 43 N.Y.2d 184, 189 n.2, 371 N.E.2d 798,801
n.2, 401 N.Y.S.2d 36, 39 n.2. (1977).
363. See supra note 355.
364. 45 N.Y.2d 24, 379 N.E.2d 172,407 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1978).
365. 200 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20, 1988, at 21, col. 3 (2d Cir.).
366. See id.
367. 70 N.Y.2d 244, 514 N.E.2d 105, 519 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1981) (discussed in last year's
Survey).
368. 71 N.Y.2d 284, 519 N.E.2d 1375, 525 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1988).
369. See Boronow, 71 N.Y.2d at 286, 519 N.E.2d at 1376, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 180.
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B. Issue Preclusion
July 7, 1988, was issue preclusion day at the New York Court
of Appeals in Albany. The Court decided three opinions which provide the bar and bench with new guidelines for when issue preclusion effect may be given to administration determinations. In Allied Chemical v. Mohawk Power Corp.,3?O and Staatsburg Water
Co. v. Staatsburg Fire District:?' the Court pointed to three additional factors that must be considered by courts when applying the
doctrine to administrative determinations. Also, in Halyalkar v.
Board of Regents,sT2the Court cut back on when preclusive effect
can be given to administrative consent orders. Together, these
three decisions restrict the Court's application of issue preclusion
to the results of non-judicial proceedings as set forth in Ryan v.
New York Telephone Co.373
In Ryan, the Court of Appeals ruled for the first time that the
doctrine of issue preclusion can be applied to administrative determinations to bar subsequent litigation of claims in judicial forum~.~?'
Ryan was discharged by the New York Telephone Company after being arrested for theft of company property. The
arrest was based on the testimony of two security investigators
who claimed that Ryan had removed company property from the
workplace. After his discharge, Ryan applied for unemployment insurance benefits, but his application was rejected by a claims examiner on the ground that the discharge was the result of Ryan's
own misconduct. Ryan filed an administrative appeal and was
granted a hearing before an Unemployment Insurance Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After considering the testimony of Ryan
and the hearsay testimony of one witness, the ALJ sustained the
ruling of the claims examiner and found that the " 'claimant was
seen . . . removing company property from the company premises.' "375 The ALJ then affirmed the denial of Ryan's unemployment benefits. This ruling was affirmed by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board and upheld by the Appellate Division. Prior

370. 72 N.Y.2d 271, 528 N.E.2d 153, 532 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1988).
371. 72 N.Y.2d 147, 527 N.E.2d 754, 531 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1988).
372. 72 N.Y.2d 261, 527 N.E.2d 1222, 532 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1988).
373. 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.SSd 823 (1984).
374. See Ryan, 62 N.Y.2d at 499, 467 N.E.2d at 489, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
375. Id. at 498,467 N.E.2d at 489,478 N.Y.S.2d at 825 (quoting findings of the Administrative Law Judge).
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to the Appellate Division's affirmation of the administrative determination, Ryan filed a tort action for false arrest, malicious prosecution, slander and wrongful discharge. The defendant raised an
affirmative defense that because this turned on the question of
Ryan's misconduct, res judicata barred relitigation of the issue.
The affirmative defense was dismissed by the Special Term and
the Appellate Division affirmed?76The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that issue preclusion applied.g77As a result of the bar's
criticism of Ryan, it was legislatively overruled in 1987 by section
623 of the Labor Law.S78The new law generally provides, with
some limitations, that no finding of fact or law in a decision made
on a claim for unemployment insurance may be given preclusive
effect in a subsequent litigation.s7s Nonetheless, the broader principles for which Ryan represented remained unchanged until July 7,
1988.
In Staatsburg Water Co., the Court held that a determination
by the Public Service Commission (PSC) was not binding on a defendant in a supreme court action."O The PSC had conducted a
public hearing and issued a determination purporting to resolve
the underlying controversy in the plaintiffs favor. In Allied Chemical, the Court held that a PSC determination did preclude subsequent litigation of the identical claims in a judicial forum.s81 Both
opinions stand for the proposition that whenever issue preclusion
arises from determinations of administrative agencies, additional
factors must be considered by the court. These factors are part of a
"multifaceted inquiry" designed to determine if the agency decision was "quasi-judicial in character," and they are to be considered with the requirements of identity of issue and full and fair
opportunity to litigate. First, a court must determine if the agency
had statutory authority to act adjudicatively. If so, the court must
ascertain whether the procedures used in the administrative proceeding demonstrate that the "facts asserted were adequately
tested, and that the issue was fully aired." Finally, the court must

376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

See id. at 497-98, 467 N.E.2d at 489, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t 825.
See id. a t 505,467 N.E.2d a t 493,478 N.Y.S.2d a t 829.
N.Y. LAB.LAW 3 623 (McKinney 1988).
See id.
See Staatsburg Water Co., 72 N.Y.2d a t 156, 527 N.E.2d at 758, 531 N.Y.S.2d a t

880.
381. See Allied Chemical, 7 2 N.Y.2d at 277,528 N.E.2d at 155-56,532 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
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examine the "expectations of the parties." Thus, a party who explicitly solicits resolution of an issue from an agency and who fully
participates in the administrative proceeding may be fairly precluded from relitigating the matter. "Expectations" means more
than the knowledge that an administrative determination may
have "potential collateral effects."
In Halyalkar, the Court cast new light on a question that has
remained unresolved for many years. When is a matter actually
litigated so as to satisfy the identicality requirement under
Schwartz v. Public A d m i n i s t r a t ~ r ?Since
~ ~ ~ the 1896 case of Reich
v. C0chran,3~~
when the Court of Appeals gave preclusive effect to
a default judgment, issue preclusion has generally been applied to
default and consent judgments. This position has been criticized
by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and was impliedly rejected in 1985 by the Court of Appeals in Kaufman v. Eli Lilly &
Co.3s4In Halyalkar, the Court suggests that identicality of issue is
unlikely to ever be satisfied when a determination rests solely on a
default or consent order. Dr. Halyalkar had entered a plea before
the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners whereby he was
found guilty of professional misconduct in knowingly filing false
medical examination reports. Five years later, the New York Office
of Profession Medical Conduct filed similar charges and the Board
of Regents suspended Dr. Halyalkar's physician's license for one
year without a hearing on the grounds that issue preclusion applied.386The Appellate Division held that the two basic requirements of issue preclusion had been satisfied: (1)the identicality of
an issue necessarily decided in the prior action with one which is
decisive of the present action, and (2) that there was a full and fair
opportunity to contest the issue in the prior action.386The Court of
Appeals addressed only the identicality question and concluded
The Court stressed that issue preclusion is
that it did not exi~t.9~'
a doctrine based on general notions of fairness involving a practical
inquiry into the realities of litigation and concluded that, unlike a

382. 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N . Y . s . ~ ~955 (1969).
383. 151 N.Y. 122, 45 N.E. 367 (1896).
384. 65 N.Y.2d 449, 482 N.E.2d 63, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1985).
385. See Halyalkar, 72 N.Y.2d at 264-65, 527 N.E.2d a t 1223-24, 532 N.Y.S.2d a t 87.
386. See id. at 266, 527 N.E.2d at 1224, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
387. See id. at 266, 527 N.E.2d a t 1224-25, 532 N.Y.S.2d a t 88. Unlike the Staatsburg
Water Co. case, the petitioner in Halyalkar did not challenge whether the administrative
procedure was quasi-judicial in nature.
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guilty plea for commission of a felony or other crime, consent pleas
to administrative suspensions or revocations of licenses cannot be
given preclusive effect.388
In conclusion, all three cases narrow application of issue preclusion to administrative determinations. Halyalkar also implicitly
holds that consent orders and default judgments will not be given
preclusive effect in any context unless it is unequivocally clear that
a party could specifically foresee that that order or default would
be later used against him and nonetheless deliberately decided to
forego his full and fair opportunity to litigate in the first instance.
VII. MOTIONPRACTICE
The number of reported motion cases during the Survey year
is impressive.38BOne important opinion is Mihlovan v. G r o z a ~ u , ~ ~ ~
in which the Court of Appeals resolved conflicting views in the
First and Second Departments and ruled that all parties must be
notified if a dismissal motion is to be converted into one for summary judgment.3s1 Motions to amend pleadings were not liberally
granted by courts during 1988 (if you snooze, you sometimes
lose)392and motions to amend notices of claim were not encouraged by the appellate courts.9B3The practitioner should also

388. See id. a t 268-69, 527 N.E.2d a t 1226, 532 N.Y.S.2d a t 89.
H. KORN& A. MILLER,NEW YORKCIVILPRACTICE,
Art. 32
389. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN,
(Supp. 1988).
390. 72 N.Y.2d 506, 531 N.E.2d 288, 534 N.Y.S.2d 656 (1988); see also Spencer, Court
of Appeals Settles Conflict on Notices, 200 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 1988, a t 1, col. 3. The Court
of Appeals held that the Appellate Division could not properly convert defendant's motion
into a summary judgment absent "adequate notice to the parties," which must be expressly
given by the court unless the parties otherwise have adequate notice., See Mihlouan, 72
N.Y.2d a t 508,531 N.E.2d a t 289,534 N.Y.S.2d a t 657; see also N.Y. CPLR 3211(c) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1989). Thus, trial courts must indicate they are clearly chartering a summary judgment course.
391. See Mihlovan, 72 N.Y.2d at'508,531 N.E.2d a t 289,534 N.Y.S.2d a t 657. The nonmoving party must be given an "opportunity to make an adequate record" under CPLR
3211(c). See N.Y. CPLR 3211(c) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1989).
392. See Saferstein v. Mideast Sys., Ltd., 143 A.D.2d 82, 531 N.Y.S.2d 333 (2d Dep't
1988); Ross v. Ross, 143 A.D.2d 429,532 N.Y.S.2d 573 (2d Dep't 1988); Courageous Syndicate, Inc. v. People-to-People Sports Comm., Inc., 141 A.D.2d 599, 529 N.Y.S.2d 520 (2d
Dep't 1988); Arrieta v. E-ZTech, 138 A.D.2d 657,526 N.Y.S.2d 473 (2d Dep't 1988). But see
Cepeda v. Hertz Corp., 141 A.D.2d 394,529 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1st Dep't 1988) (leave to amend
granted to update injuries related to accident); Hawkins v. Genessee Place Corp., 139
A.D.2d 433, 527 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1st Dep't 1988) (leave granted to amend answer).
393. See Serrano v. City of New York, 143 A.D.2d 652,533 N.Y.S.2d 9 (2d Dep't 1988)
(leave to amend notice of claim denied); Eagle v. City of Yonkers, 143 A.D.2d 626, 532
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note that amendment of a complaint after a motion to dismiss does
not abate the motion.sw
CPLR 3 2 1 5 ( ~ ) gives
= ~ ~ the plaintiff one year to obtain a default judgment against the defendanLsS6If the plaintiff doesn't act,
the defendant can move to dismiss the action.s87If the defendant
serves his answer, however, he then waives the plaintiffs delay and
9 ~ ~Appellate Divithe action continues.99BIn Myers v. S l ~ t s k y , the
sion, Second Department, refers to this phenomenon as the defendant in default for not defaulting the plaintiff who failed to default the defendant.
There was additional motion practice during the Survey year
as a result of plaintiffs neglecting to serve certificates with their
complaints in medical malpractice cases.'OO The Appellate Division,
Second Department, has made it clear that the &davit of merit
under CPLR 3012-a401must be by a physician and not a layman/02
Furthermore, failure to submit the afiidavit will result in a dismisAlso, the certificate requirement
sal of plaintiffs c~mplaint.'~~
under CPLR 3012-a is applicable to actions commenced in the
court of claims.""

N.Y.S.2d 887 (2d Dep't 1988) (same); Groshans v. Town of Babylon, 143 A.D.2d 666, 533
N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d Dep't 1988) (same).
394. See Sholom & Zuckerbrot Realty Corp. v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group,
138 Misc. 2d 799, 525 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1988).
395. N.Y. CPLR 3215(c) (McKinney 1970).
396. See id.
397. See id.
398. See id.
399. 139 A.D.2d 709, 527 N.Y.S.2d 464 (2d Dep't 1988).
400. See Santangelo v. Raskin, 137 A.D.2d 74,528 N.Y.S.2d 90 (2d Dep't 1988) (failure
to comply is default); Jacoby v. Veloso, 141 Misc. 2d 958,535 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Sup. Ct., Richmond Co. 1988) (dismissing malpractice action for lack of CPLR 3012-a filing); Haimoviei v.
Haimoviei, -Mic. 2
d -N.Y.S.2d -(Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1988) (concluding
that claim cannot be characterized as a medical malpractice action and, thus, no CPLR
3012-a filing required). The certificate requirement in medical malpractice cases does not
apply to counterclaims. See Koplick v. Arnott, 137 Misc. 2d 944,522 N.Y.S.2d 770 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1987).
401. N.Y. CPLR 3012-a (McKinney 1974).
402. See Ward v. Hoffman, 139 A.D.2d 691, 527 N.Y.S.2d 447 (2d Dep't 1988).
403. See id. a t 693, 527 N.Y.S.2d a t 448; see also Sullivan v. H.I.P. Hosp., Inc., 138
Mic. 2d 711, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (Sup. C t , Queens Co. 1988) (failure to serve certificate of
merit does not make the cause of action defective for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as
plaintiff has 45 days to submit an expert's affidavit to support granting of leave to serve a
later certificate).
404. See Brown v. State, 139 Mic. 2d 1020, 528 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Ct. of Claims 1988)
(court rejected argument that language of CPLR 3012-a refers only to "plaintiff' and "com-
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VIII. DISCLOSURE
Of the many disclosure decisions rendered during the Survey
year, the following areas should be of interest to the practitioner.
Also, non-party disclosure practice has generated several instructive opinions by our courts in 1988.

A. CPLR 3101
A 1988 amendment to CPLR 3101(d)(1)406
adds a new subparagraph (ii) and redesignates the old (ii) to become (iii). These
changes permit any party to offer to identify its medical expert
and submit her to depositions if all other parties agree to forego
the medical malpractice panel.406 Of course, the other parties must
agree to make their experts available for an EBT also.407
The attorney's work product privilege is not often recognized
in New York civil practice because, unlike federal practice, the
privilege is absolute.408Nonetheless, in Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield,40B the Appellate Division, First Department, held that a
memorandum by the insurer's associate in-house counsel on the issue of a possible lawsuit against the insurer was an attorney work
product document.41° Also, the Appellate Division, Third Department, ruled, in Hoopes v. Carota,411that the attorney-client privilege may yield to a strong public policy requiring disclosure and
the burden of showing that the information sought is within the
privilege is upon the party asserting it.'12 Finally, the Appellate
Division, Second Department, held, in O'Connell v. Jones,413 that
because photographs prepared for litigation under CPLR
3101(d)414could not be duplicated due to a change in weather con-

plaint," rather than "complaint" and "claim," and was therefore not applicable in court of
claims).
405. N.Y. CPLR 3101(d)(l) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
406. See id.
407. See id.
408. See D. SIEGEL,
supra note 79, a t 3 347.
409. 140 A.D.2d 198, 528 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1st Dep't 1988).
410. See Rossi, 140 A.D.2d a t 200,528 N.Y.S.2d a t 53 ("The document reflects the use
of the attorney's professional skills in analyzing the language used in the rejection letters!').
411. 142 A.D.2d 906, 531 N.Y.S.2d 407 (3d Dep't 1988).
412. See Hoopes, 142 A.D.2d a t 909, 531 N.Y.S.2d a t 410.
413. 140 A.D.2d 676, 529 N.Y.S.2d 19 (2d Dep't 1988).
414. N.Y. CPLR 3101(d) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
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ditions, the plaintiff could discover them.4lS
B. CPLR 3126
What happens if opposing counsel loses control at an EBT,
uses intemperate language, and obstructs your line of questioning?
Can you get his client's case dismissed? No, said the Appellate Division, Third Department, in Mink v. Conifer Park, Inc.416 Sanctions are available against the attorney for his obstructive behavior, but it is highly unlikely any court will dismiss the action unless
the plaintiff acts improperly during the EBT. With the new sanction rules effective January 1, 1989, "grin and bear it." After all,
you're earning legal fees plus a monetary sanction award of up to
$10,000 for your adversary's frivolous behavior.
C. Unlimited Disclosure in Custody Disputes?
In Burgel v. Burgel,"' the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that in custody disputes the broadest possible latitude
should be accorded to reasonable discovery requests because the
best interests of the children is of primary concern.418Thus, one
spouse may compel a test of the other spouse's hair to ascertain if
he or she uses cocaine.(lB
D. Pre-Action Disclosure

aso on

and the Reverend Alfred C.
Attorney C. Vernon
Sharpton sought pre-action disclosure against CBS under CPLR
3102(~).'~OThey wanted to take depositions of the named respondents and discover and inspect all documents, including audio and
video recordings and photographs, pertaining in any manner to
Tawana Brawly. In Mason u. CBS,421the Supreme Court, New
York County denied pre-action disclosure on the grounds it is limited only to information necessary to frame a colorable

415. See O'Connell, 140 kD.2d at 676-77, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 20 (pictures of icy accident
in slip-and-fall case).
416. 142 A.D.2d 899, 531 N.Y.S.2d 400 (3d Dep't 1988).
417. 141 A.D.2d 215, 533 N.Y.S.2d 735 (2d Dep't 1988).
418. See Burgel, 141 A.D.2d at 216, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
419. See id. at 218-19, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 737; see also Anderson, Court Requires Hair
Samples of Mother in Custody Dispute, 200 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
420. N.Y. CPLR 3102(c) (McKinney 1970).
d -N.Y.S.2d -(Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1988).
421. -Misc. 2
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E. Non-Party Document Discovery
Non-party document discovery is available under CPLR
3111423and CPLR 3120(b).'24 In federal practice it is obtained pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45.'25 Non-party document discovery, particularly in complex litigation matters, is an
important weapon in the litigator's handbag and, as a result, we
have several interesting Survey year decisions to highlight.
The United States Supreme Court ruled, in United States
Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, I ~ C .that
,'~~
nonparties held in contempt, for failure to reply to a district
court's subpoena duces tecum for documents, could challenge the
court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction in defense of the civil
contempt citation.'27 In a related matter, the New York Court of
Appeals held that a non-party journalist's photos were immune
from discl~sure.'~~
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ruled that a
district court's order denying a motion to compel a non-party witness to answer pretrial depositions was not appealable.'29 In Dioguardi v. St. John's Riverside Ho~pital,'~~
the Appellate Division,
Second Department, afErmed an order denying the deposition of a
non-party witness on the grounds that there was an absence of
"adequate circumstances" showing that the information sought to
be discovered could not be obtained from other source^.'^' This decision is puzzling because a 1984 amendment expressly removed
the term "adequate special circumstances" from CPLR
3101(a)(4)432and it should not now be resurrected by judicial fiat.

422. See id.
423. N.Y. CPLR 3111 (McKinney 1970).
424. N.Y. CPLR 3120(b) (McKinney 1970).
425. FED.R. CIV.P. 45; see also Carlisle, Nonparty Document Discovery From Corporations and Governmental Entities Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 32 N.Y.L.
SCH.L. REV.9 (1987) (discussion of non-party discovery under federal rules).
426. 108 S. Ct. 2268 (1988).
427. U.S. Catholic Conference, 108 S. Ct. a t 2270.
428. See O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr. Co., 71 N.Y.2d 521,523 N.E.2d 277,528 N.Y.S.2d
1 (1988).
429. See Barrick Group, Inc. v. Mosse, 849 F.2d 70, 71 (2d Cir. 1988).
430. 144 A.D.2d 333, 533 N.Y.S.2d 915 (2d Dep't 1988).
431. See Dioguardi, 144 A.D.2d a t 334-35, 533 N.Y.S.2d a t 916.
OF THE ADVISORY
C O M MON ~CNU
~ PRACTICE
432. See Act of Feb. 15, 1984, REPORT
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Another important non-party disclosure case during the Surwhere the Appellate Divivey year is I n re Estate of Ko~hovos,'~~
sion, First Department, reminded the bar that lawyers cannot
serve subpoenas on non-party witnesses for production of documents without notice to other par tie^.'^' Failure to comprehend
this simple rule, which is understood by any law school graduate
who has taken a course in New York Civil Practice, has already
generated too much litigati~n.'~~

IX. MISCELLANEOUS
During the Survey year, some decisions and other items of interest emerged that merit mentioning.
n t Specified in Notice of Appeal
A. ~ i t i ~ aNot
1n Torres v. Oakland Scavenger CO.,'~~
the United States Su-

CHIEFADMINISTRATOR
OF THE COURTS
OF THE STATEOF NEWYORK,1984 MCKINNEY'S
SESS.LAWSOF N.Y. 3708.
433. 140 A.D.2d 180, 528 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1st Dep't 1988).
434. See Kochouos, 140 A.D.2d a t 181, 528 N.Y.S.2d a t 38 ("The service of subpoenas
on these non-party witnesses, requiring production of documents and attendance a t a deposition without notice to the other parties to the action violates the express provisions of
CPLR 3107 and CPLR 3120(b), which require notice to all adverse parties when such discovery devices are served on non-parties.").
435. In I n re Beiny, 129 A.D.2d 126, 517 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1st Dep't), reh'g denied, 132
A.D.2d 190,522 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1st Dep't 1987), a Big Law Firm (BLF) violated the "purple
rule" and the "giggle rule" and proved once again that big doesn't mean smart. In Beiny, a
BLF served an EBT notice and document subpoena on a non-party defunct law firm in
Manhattan which had accumulated "records" from their prior representation of the BLF's
adversary. The records were turned over to the BLF which promptly cancelled the EBT.
Shortly thereafter, the records were used by the BLF a t an EBT in London. The lawyers for
the other side moved to suppress the documents and to disqualify the BLF. The Appellate
Division, First Department, did just that and the BLF moved for reargument. See id. a t
127-30,517 N.Y.S.2d a t 475-76. This was like the airplane that caught fire in the hangar on
Floyd Bennett Field in Brooklyn. (The rescue squad tried to put out the fire with gasoline.)
The BLF's argument on its rehearing motion made the Appellate Division, First Department, turn purple and then giggle. The motion was denied and the matter referred to the
Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Department. Even BLF's have to follow
the words of Mr. Kenny Rogers who said "[ylou have to know when to hold, you have to
know when to run and you have to know when to quit!' As the First Department stated in
Kochouos, "[tlhe deceptive practice of counsel in engaging in this type of covert discovery
warrants severe criticism." Kochouos, 140 A.D.2d a t 181, 528 N.Y.S.2d a t 38. If you ask a
nonparty for documents and they give them to you, no notice is necessary to opposing counsel; but if you use judicial process, read CPLR 320(b) which requires notice! See N.Y. CPLR
320(b) (McKinney 1972).
436. 108 S. Ct. 2405 (1988).

TO THE
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preme Court held that a circuit court of appeals cannot waive the
jurisdictional requirement of naming parties to an appeal, even for
~ ~ there was not jurisdiction over the appeal of a
good c a u ~ e . 4Thus,
litigant who was not specified in the notice of appeal due to a clerical error on the part of the secretary employed by the litigant's
att0rney.4~~

B. Motions to Withdraw
Can an attorney accept a retainer with a written provision allowing him to withdraw a t any time? In Heinike Associates v. Libthe Appellate Division, Fourth Departerty National B~nk,4~O
ment, said no! Absent good and sufficient cause, the attorney of
record must stay on the case.440

C. Dismissals Without Prejudice in the Second Circuit

If a plaintiff seeks to dismiss her complaint without prejudice,
and the trial court judge decides that if the motion is granted the
complaint will be dismissed with prejudice, the plaintiff must be
given an opportunity to withdraw the m0tion.4~' Also, a plaintiff
cannot voluntarily dismiss a complaint and refile for purposes of
overcoming an inadvertent failure to timely file a jury
D. Damages for Loss of Enjoyment and Emotional or Psychological Loss
The Court of Appeals held, in Lynch v. Bay Ridge Obstetrical
& Gynecological A s s o ~ i a t e s , 4that
~ ~ "emotional" or "psychological"
damages in medical malpractice cases can be recovered.444Similarly, in McDougald v. G ~ r b e r , 4the
~ ~Appellate Division, First Department, held that loss of enjoyment of life is a damage element
separate and distinct from pain and suffering for which compensa-

437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
1987).
443.
444.
445.

See Torres, 108 S. Ct. at 2407-08.
See id. at 2409.
142 A.D.2d 929, 530 N.Y.S.2d 355 (4th Dep't 1988).
See Heinike Assocs., 142 A.D.2d at 930, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
See Gravatt v. Columbia Univ., 845 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1988).
See McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 683 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y.
72 N.Y.2d 632, 532 N.E.2d 1239, 536 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1988).
See Lynch, 72 N.Y.2d at 635, 532 N.E.2d at 1240, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
135 A.D.2d 80, 524 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1st Dep't 1988).
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tion may be awarded despite the injured party's lack of cognitive

E. Certification to the New York Court of Appeals
In Deweerth v. Baldinger,"' the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, under New York law, certification of issues
to the New York Court of Appeals should be limited to issues
likely to occur with some frequency.44s
F. Dismissals for Mootness
In Boggs v. NYC Health & Hospitals C~rp.:'~the Court of
Appeals held that an appeal challenging Billy Boggs' involuntary
commitment to a psychiatric hospital was rendered moot by her
release after oral argument but prior to a decision by the Court?60

G. Failure to Object to a Federal Magistrate's
Recommendations
In Wesolek v. Canadair, Ltd.:61 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that failure to file objections in the district
court to a magistrate's recommendation precluded a review on the
merits of that court's adoption of the recommendation^.'^^

H. Southern District Changes Related Case Form
The Board of Judges for the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York voted to change a form that is
used by attorneys in filing civil complaints to notify the court of
other related cases in the district. The revision removes a provision
of the form that has required lawyers to file a related case only if
they intended to move for consolidation of the related cases?6s

446. See McDougald, 135 A.D.2d at 94, 524 N.Y.S.2d at 200-01.
447. 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987).
448. See Deweerth, 836 F.2d at 108 n.5.
449. 70 N.Y.2d 972, 520 N.E.2d 515, 525 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988).
450. See Boggs, 70 N.Y.2d at 974, 520 N.E.2d at 516, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
451. 838 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988).
452. See Wesolek, 838 F.2d at 58.
453. See Squiers, District Judges Change Related-Case Form, 200 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 21,
1988, at 1, col. 3.
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I. United States Supreme Court: Selection of Cases
A new bill passed by Congress abolishes the requirement that
the Supreme Court hear certain types of cases that have previously
fallen within their mandatory jurisdiction. Thus, no longer must
the Supreme Court hear cases in which the highest court of a state
has upheld a state or local law against a federal constitutional
challenge or has held a federal statute unconstitutional. The bill
preserves mandatory jurisdiction by the Supreme Court for a few
appeals involving decisions by special three-judge federal district
courts in certain voting rights cases.464In this respect, the Survey
reader is reminded that, as a practical matter, the New York Court
of Appeals "represents the court of last resort for virtually every
litigant who appears before it."466In fact, the United States Supreme Court heard only one case from the New York Court of Appeals during its 1987-88 term.466

J. Runaway Juries
The United States Supreme Court has agreed to hear a defendant's argument that there is a constitutional right under the
eighth amendment to be free from excessive damages in a civil lawsuit. In the case before the Court, a Vermont jury awarded allegedly excessive punitive damages to Kelco Disposal, Inc. because of
unfair competition from Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont.457
We will discuss this interesting development in next year's Survey.

We are again grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions from our colleagues of the bench and bar and in academia. I
am particularly thankful to the 1989 graduating class of the Pace
University School of Law for keeping me ever alert to new develop-

454. See N.Y. Times, June 9, 1988, at A-25, col. 4.
455. Stein, New York Court of Appeals Roundup, 200 N.Y.L.J.,Aug. 29,1988, at 3, col.
1 (referring to Annual Report of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals).
456. See id.
457. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1988, at A-34, col. 6. The actual damages were less than
$10,000 while the punitive damages awarded were in excess of $6 million.
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ments in New York Civil Practice. I hope to return safe and sound
from a semester of teaching remedies at University College in
London so that I can contribute to the 1990 Syracuse Law Review
Survey of New York Law.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE OF NEW CPLR AMENDMENTS (1988)
CPLR Section or Rule

Amendment

Effective Date

Amended to extend applicability of statute to "Agent Orange" actions commenced no later than 6/16/90.

Amended substituted service and "nailing and mailing" provisions
to require delivery and mailing or affixing and mailing to be effected within 20 days of each other; to require proof of service to
be filed within 20 days of whichever is effected later; to make statute gender neutral.

Added new subdivision (g) permitting removal from one local (i.e.
district, town, village or city) court to another in the same or an
adjoining county whenever all judges in transferring court are unavailable or a.jury cannot be assembled.

Added new paragraph (3) providing venue alternative-county of
petitioner's residence-for Supreme Court proceedings against
commissioner of education filed pursuant to Education Law 8
4404.

Amended to renumber subparagraph (ii) as (iii) and add new subparagraph (ii), permitting consensual deposition of expert witnesses in lieu of holding a malpractice panel hearing.

Amended subdivision (b) to bring podiatric cases into scope of the
rules; governing pre-calendar conferences in medical and dental
malpractice cases, and to include expert witness deposition offers
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and schedules in the conferences' scope. See amendment to CPLR
3101.

Amended to make subsections (d), (e) and (f) applicable to all actions in which trial has not begun as of August 1, 1988.

Amended to broaden the description of library records deemed
confidential.

Amended to increase maximum amount of bill or invoice admissible as prima facie proof of damages, from $1,500 to $2,000.

Repealed subdivision (b) and added new (b) requiring that lumpsum payments be made by the medical malpractice insurance
association.

Amended to include "agreements or stipulations incorporated by
reference in a judgment" in definition of "order of support."

Amended to make subdivision (c) applicable to all actions in which
trial has not begun as of August 1, 1988.

Amended to set a duration of 15 days for an automatic stay pending appeal-by the state, or a political subdivision or agency of the
state from an adverse decision in an Article 78 proceeding involving license revocation and certain specified small entities.

Added new subdivision (g) containing special provisions governing
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stays in large-verdict (i.e., damages over one million dollars) medical, dental and podiatric malpractice actions.

Amended L. 1986, ch. 682, to make subdivision (b) applicable to all
actions in which trial has not begun as of August 1, 1988.

Amended to increase subpoenaed-witness fees from $2.00 to $15.00
for attendance, and from 8 cents to 23 cents per mile for travel
expenses; and to make statute gender neutral.

Amended to exempt Westchester County from the statute's structured fee for display advertising of legal notices.

Amended to relocate the previously misplaced "(a)" after the section heading.

Amended to add services to the list of items for which no fee may
be charged where an index number has been assigned.

Repealed.

Added new subdivision (f), setting fees for copying and certification of county clerk or county register records.

Amended to delete preparation and certification fees, and renumber (f)(5) as (fI(2).
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Amended to delete (a)(6) and (a)(?) which provided for certain
fees relating to papers and instruments in connection with real
property, renumber (a)(8)-(a)(13) as (a)(6)-(a)(11); and amend
(a)(12), now (a)(10), to include "recording" a notice of pendency or
amended notice of pendency.

Amended paragraph 10 of subdivision (b) to apply to all counties
in New York State, eliminating restriction to the counties within
New York City.

Amended to delete (c)(6), (c)(8) and (c)(9); and to renumber (c)(7)
as (c)(6) and (c)(lO)-(c)(12) as (c)(7)-(~)(9).

Amended to eliminate special costs for the counties in New York
City; and, for all counties, to set costs awarded in proceedings
before note of issue is filed a t $200, costs awarded after filing of
note of issue but before trial a t $200, and for each trial, inquest or
assessment of damages, a t $300.

Amended to increase costs awarded on a motion to $100 for all
counties.

Amended to increase costs awarded on an appeal to the Appellate
Division to $250, unless the court awards a lesser amount, whether
awarded before or after argument.

Amended to increase costs on appeal to Court of Appeals to $500,
unless the court awards a lesser amount, whether awarded before
or after argument.
8303(a)(6)

08/01/88
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Amended to permit discretionary award of costs to plaintiff in an
action brought under General Business Law 5 520-a (requirements
for credit card transaction forms).

Amended to delete reference to General Business Law Article 26-A
(regulation of theatrical syndication financing) and to insert reference to its current location in Arts and Cultural Affairs Law Article 23.
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